Effect of UK Anti-terrorism Legislation on Human Rights

The implications of recent UK anti-terrorism legislation on human rights.

Introduction

The law on terrorism in the United Kingdom has been described as ‘an unmitigated disaster’[1]. In todays society the threat of terrorism is at a dangerous level and the legislation in place has been unstable to say the least. Much criticism is to do with the compatibility of the legislation with the ECHR[2]. Governments continuously face the challenge of striking the correct balance between the safety and security of the public against threats of terrorism and individual human rights. It has been understood that ‘the interference with a right or freedom may be more readily justified in the case of terrorism’[3]. There have been several pieces of legislation brought in after 9/11, they all saw new legislation or amendments.

In terms of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights sets out those rights which are protected. In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 allows for these rights to be enforced in the UK, without having to go through the trouble of taking it to the European Court of Human Rights. The UK has to abide to this convention, Section 6(1) of the HRA 1998 makes it ‘unlawful for courts to act in a manner incompatible with the Convention rights, and UK Courts are thus obliged to have regard to Convention rights’[4]. In the majority of cases human rights issues are resolved in the domestic court but on occasion they have been taken to the Strasbourg Court. Evidently the UK does not always get it right on matters concerning the convention.

The ECHR and The Human Rights Act plays a central role in that they need to be adhered to both in relation to state security and individual rights. If states were unable to compromise when it comes to all individual rights, then it would make it impossible to effectively fight terrorism. As a result, rights under the ECHR have been grouped in to three categories ‘Absolute rights’[5], these are articles that are not seen possible to compromise, an example Article 3 of the ECHR relating to torture, countries in the ECHR cannot under any circumstance violate this article. Chahal v United Kingdom[6] states ‘the convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the victim’s conduct’[7].

‘Fundamental rights’[8] are the next to be identified, these are cited as rights that ‘can be curtailed for the sake of the rights of others’[9]  rights to liberty and due process under Article 5 and 6 are listed as these. Finally, there are ‘provisional rights’ which can be balanced on proportionality with the rights of others and rights of ‘societal interests’[10]. Article 8 and 11 of the convention are under these. Although different types of rights have been identified there has been much difficulty in establishing the threshold in terms of the point in which the balance becomes a breach. This has been reflected in the UK’s ever changing anti-terrorism legislation, and the ongoing cases against the Home Secretary of State. Using the most recent piece of UK anti-terrorism legislation, the counter terrorism and security act 2015, What are the implications of recent UK anti-terrorism legislation on human rights?

The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2015

The most recent piece of legislation, The Counter-terrorism and security Act 2015 was passed as a result of the threat of terrorism in 2014 being raised to severe from substantial by the Joint Terrorism analysis centre[11]. It implements legislation relating to preventing people travelling overseas to participate in terrorism related activities and the returning, as well as dealing with those already in the UK who pose a threat. The Act increases powers of various public bodies, such as the police, in an attempt to improve the effectiveness of measures using to combat terrorism. The Act’s provisions can be identified into six key areas[12]. Firstly, in relation to temporary restrictions on travel when suspected of being involved in terrorism the powers are strengthened. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures which already exist[13]have been enhanced. The extension of retention of communications data that will aid in identifying whom is responsible for accessing internet services or sending communications. Security arrangements for transport strengthened and programmes which attempt to combat ideology supporting terrorism will be improved.  The Act has both brought amendments to already existing measures in particular, The Terrorism investigation and prevention Act 2011, also it has introduced new measures, Travel exclusion orders.

Terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIM’s) and the 2015 Act

Part 2 of the 2015 Act relates to the Terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIM’s) which already exist in the Terrorism prevention and investigation measure Act 2011. This allows the Secretary of State to impose measures onto individuals whom are expected to be involved in terrorist related activity’s.  The 2015 Act amends section 1 of the 2011 Act, Section 16 refers to the amendment of the 2011 Act, in particular to the overnight residence measures listed within Section1 of the 2011 Act. The amendment is made in subsections (1) to (5) of section 16. It allows for the secretary of state to agree with an individual a locality in which that they must reside in or the secretary of state can require the individual to live in a residence that they consider appropriate[14]. It also adds that ‘If there are premises that are the individual’s own residence at the time when the TPIM notice is imposed, the Secretary of State may only require the individual to live in a residence that is more than 200 miles from those premises if the individual agrees’[15].

This amendment essentially gives the secretary of state power to chose where they live, and in effect relocate. This may be problematic in terms of the ECHR, the 2011 Act when introduced essentially removed this power of relocation, which was available in control orders in the 2005[16] Act. This power of relocation although not contested by judges, it was recommended that actions should be taken to reduce interference, CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department Queen’s Bench Division the judge acknowledged a substantial interference and stated that the interference ‘could and should be abated by the secretary of state reimbursing at least a proportion of the costs of D’s family in travelling to the specified place’[17] he then goes on to acknowledge that relocation can have an ‘onerous and isolating effect’[18]. Judges for the sake of national security found the power or relocation necessary, however they describe them as ‘isolating and onerous’, this is also supported by the judgment stating that costs incurred relating to these measurements, should be in some part reimbursed, as the effort was being made to lessen the effect of the interference of Article 8. Clearly illustrating that there is a substantial amount of interference. Furthermore, the section states that if they have a residence when the order is given then the secretary of state cannot require them to move more than 200 miles away, therefore if the individual does not have a residence the secretary of state can require them to move 200 miles away. This can be seen to be unfair, if that individual does have family and friends that want to visit then they could be made to travel over 200 miles away. Making it more likely to result in a breach of Article 8 ECHR as it would be more interference with private and family life than it would be for some one who cannot be required to move more than 200 miles away.

Relocation clearly was not a favoured executive measure made evident by the removal of them in the 2011 Act, partly due to their restrictions on human rights. However, a similar power has remerged in the 2015 bill. The government has in effect taken one step towards balancing the rights of individual by invoking the 2011 Act, then one step back, by amending it with the 2015 Act, which has enhanced the powers the Secretary of State. This reinstatement may breach Article 5 of the ECHR, in relation to liberty. The evolution of the UK legislation in incorporating the rights of individuals has seemed to have reversed in relation to this specific issue. TPIM’s were seen to be unsuccessful, not tough enough, which may have been the reason for the reinstatement of the relocation order. Leading people to believe that these measure are insufficient in dealing with this threat. Along with the heightened threat level there was a need for stronger measures, and the power of relocation was a result of this need.

In addition, in response to the 2015 bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights made their position on this apparent, they ‘reluctantly accepted’ that they are ‘extremely useful and is more effective’[19]  the Committee also go on to add that ‘the changing nature of the threat justifies the reintroduction of relocation’[20]. Even though they accept it, they do so reluctantly, suggesting that this is not favourable in terms of those individual human rights.

When reviewing the 2011 Act the JCHR made it clear that they preferred the TPIM’s to the previous control orders, they stated they ‘welcome those aspects of the Bill which Modify in significant ways aspects of the predecessor control-order regime’[21], this may explain the reluctance towards the 2015 Act had amended the TPIM’s to allow for relocation which was part of the control order regime, therefore undoing to some extent part of what the 2011 changed. They also thought that there were ‘still concerns in terms of human rights’[22] about the 2011 Act, clearly they were not completely satisfied, so this change brought in by the 2015 Act would not have been favourable by the JCHR (joint committee on human rights), as it has strengthened the powers,

and may be more likely to breach certain articles in the ECHR. Showing that the governments aim to ‘reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties and roll back state intrusion[23] is no longer as pressing, as it was in relation to the 2011 Act. Instead it is to protect the society from harm, which is understandable with the heightened threat of terrorism. With this 2015 Act it is evident protection of those individual human rights has lessened, maybe even reversed in some cases. There is much more emphasis in new legislation on ‘preventing terrorism and its negative effects on the full enjoyment of human rights’[24]. The increase in powers available to the Secretary of State within this area allows for a greater level of interference with rights under the ECHR. In support the JCHR has added that the the the amendments ‘all increase the degree to which the Secretary of State can interfere with the Article 8 and 11 rights of the TPIM subject’[25].

On the other hand, it is arguable that the government have improved legislation concerning TPIM’s for individuals who may be unfairly subject to these measures. S.20(1) of The Counter Terrorism Act 2015, substitutes the standard of proof for invoking measures from ‘reasonable belief’ to the ‘balance of probabilities’[26]. This will offer more in protection in terms of the secretary of state wrongfully imposing measures. Because the standard of proof has been raised it makes it less likely that an innocent individual will be subject to TPIM’s.

Therefore, it may be said that the government has invoked legislation that actually protect individual human rights, by raising the standard of proof it makes it very unlikely for people subject to TPMI’s to not be involved in terrorism related activity.

Seizure of passports

The power to take and cancel passports was existing already under the royal prerogative. The 2015 Act has extended this power, allowing police and border authorities to employ this power. The individual must be suspected of terrorism. S.1[27] sets out that there must be reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has the intention to leave the UK to involve themselves in terrorist related activity. In relation to the compatibility with the ECHR, it’s clear that the compliance of Article 8 may be in question.

Seizing someone’s passport will evidently have implications on the right to private and family life. Again the exception in Article 8(2) would be applicable, as it would be necessary to stop someone form leaving the UK to participate in terrorist related activities, the question would be a question of proportionality, similar to a lot of anti-terrorism measure. The seizure of passports ‘may amount to a less intrusive measure than the possible alternative of detention under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000’[28]. This statement can be agreed with completely as it is less invasive, and a more rational measure. As the aim of the 2015 Act[29] is to target those travelling to engage in terrorist related activities, removing someone’s ability to travel is far more appropriate than detaining someone.

Detaining someone is more likely to result in a breach of Article 8, as it actually confines the person into a specific place against their will, not just leaving the country. The seizure of a passport obviously stops them from leaving the country, but does not actually detain them so they are able to remain in the UK, that’s if no further measures are applied.

However, if the individual refuses the authorities are able to detain them anyway under the Antiterrorism crime and security Act 2001. It could be said that this measure has allowed for an option in anti-terrorism legislation that is less intrusive on human rights, evidently certain aspects of seizure of passports have implications which are unaccommodating to human rights.

A major criticism identified in relation to human rights is ‘the, absence during the first 14 days, of judicial intervention’[30], this may have implications on article 6 of the ECHR, the rights to a fair trial, as there is no judicial intervention until 14 days after the passport is seized. This may be compared to previous legislation, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which gave the power to take money at a port, but the power was limited to 48. In relation to this difference it has been stated that ‘interference with the right to family and private life inflicted by the retention of travel documents is surely no less important than the property rights infringed by the seizure of cash’[31]. This can be agreed with, the power to take money is restricted to 48hours, however in relation to passports, they are able to retain them for 14 days without requiring judicial intervention. Withholding someone’s passport, is surely as serious if not more than withholding money. This measure allowing for the retention of travel documents for 14 days until judicial intervention is required illustrates the governments move to strengthen measures, resulting in individuals right to a fair trial being diminished to some extent. this area of anti-terrorism legislation has several implications on certain human rights, with emphasis on Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial.

Another concern has been raised with the seizure of passports under the 2015 Act. ‘There is a danger that Article 14 of the ECHR read with 8 might be breached if the power was used in a discriminatory manor’[32].This could potentially raise ‘fears that racial profiling will again so become an issue’[33]. Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination against any ground. Much caution would be needed when determining ‘reasonable suspicion’[34].The case of A V Secretary of State for the Home department [2004] shows that it is not acceptable to single out certain groups to be subject to certain measures. This case was held in relation to the 2001 Act, and the breach of Article 5 ECHR. If the power conferred in the Act 2015 is applied in a similar way to the 2001 Act, which singled out a certain group[35], it would mean that the repealing of legislation allowing for this sort of discrimination may be undone. Having dire implications on the right against discrimination. In response to this fear it has been stated in the Code of Practise suspicion cannot be based on particular groups. Although offering some level of protection from powers being used discriminatory it is still limited.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights have also identified another situation where this measure could have implications on. The committee has given an example which may give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR, if the ‘person has nowhere to stay in the UK for the period which his travel documents are retained and no source of funds to sustain him for that period’ which would ‘effectively render the person destitute, constituting inhumane treatment’[36]

Travel exclusion orders

When introduced there was much emphasis on travel, and stopping people involved in terrorism related activities from going to other countries and returning after having contact with extremist groups. The 2015 Act introduced new measures which attempt to deal with this issue. Temporary exclusion orders were introduced (TEO), they are orders that require someone not to return to the UK, unless permitted to do so by the secretary of state or if it is a result of their deportation to the UK[37].  The secretary of state must reasonably suspect that the individual has been or is involved in Terrorism related activity[38], also they must consider it necessary to impose one of these orders to protect the public from harm. The secretary of state under s.3 must seek permission from the court for the imposition of a TEO, with the exception due to a matter of urgency it should be imposed without the courts permission. Under schedule 2 para 3(4) when considering the application for the order, it can be done so without the applicant present, ‘without notification and without him or her being given the opportunity of making representations to the court’[39]. Evidently making it extremely difficult for an individual to exercise the power of court oversight as they are not actually in the UK. Making court oversight incredibly restricted. Which may result in implications on human rights.

In relation to the ECHR, s.6(2) of the 2015 Act allows for the secretary of state to refuse a permit to return to the UK, if they require the individual to attend an interview with a police officer or immigration officers.6(2)(a). This raises concerns with the compatibility with Article 6 of the ECHR, as it could possibly lead to self-incrimination, which Article 6 protects. However, when it concerns a TEO they’ve not actually been charged with a criminal offence, which is when Article 6 comes into effect. Evidently this may allow for an avoidance of ECHR obligation on the basis of a technicality. Just because the person is not being held under

 a charge for a criminal offence, they are not entitled to the right of Article 6, protection from self incrimination, the individual may be in a similar position to those charged under a criminal offence. Along with the restricted court oversight available to them it would seem that legislation concerning this matter has little to offer in terms of protecting that right of Article 6 of the ECHR.

Furthermore, the individual can be given specific obligations with their permit to return. The different obligations which can be imposed are set out in s.9 of the 2015 Act, it refers to specific measures under the 2011 Act[40]; reporting to a police station, attendance at appointments and notification of the individuals residence or a change in residence. Notably these are the less intrusive measure which can be applied than under the 2011 Act[41]. Other measures which are listed in the 2011 Act but not applied under the 2015 Act include curfews, electronic tagging, and several others which are seen to be quite intrusive. Although, the standard of proof to impose these obligations under the 2015 Act is considerably lower than what it would be for a measure under the 2011 Act. For the 2015 Act it is reasonable suspicion, whereas for a TPIM it is judged on the balance of probabilities, there is a notable difference between the two. The 2011 raised the standard of proof from its predecessor the 2005 Act, following much criticism with the compatibility with the ECHR, by allowing the lower burden of proof for certain TPIM’s may raise concerns.

A great concern in relation to TEO’s compatibility with the ECHR is the fact that the individuals are detained outside of the UK. So it is unclear what state is responsible if there are any ECHR violations. It is not stated specifically in the 2015 Act, but there is a presumption that ‘any detention abroad or other potential violation of the ECHR resulting from the imposition of the TEO would be the responsibility of the State in question and would be under that states laws’[42].

 In addition, the host state can deport the suspected individual to the UK and the UK has to accept subject to s2(1) and section 7 of the Counter terrorism and security Act 2015. As to whether the’ jurisdiction’ of a state under Article 1 of the ECHR, extends to states out of the ECHR is important. If the state, the individual was being detained in was not in the ECHR then what would that mean for the obligations of the ECHR? The jurisdiction of a state is namely territorial, therefore on the face of it ECHR obligations would not need to be adhered to if it was a state outside of the jurisdiction of the ECHR. However, two exceptions have been identified as to the scope of the jurisdiction; if a state ‘exercises effective control over an area outside its national territory’ or if a ‘states agents exercise authority and control on the territory of another state’[43].

The jurisdiction of the ECHR may not extend in some circumstances, which may have serious implications on that individual’s human rights. Circumstances have been identified where the ECHR rights can be applied if the state detaining the individual is a member of the ECHR, or where the UK has an understanding with the state involved that enable British agencies to exercise executive power ‘in imposing TEOs combined with conditions on the territory’ of another state[44].

Unfortunately, because of the confusing nature of this issue, it is difficult to determine whether claims against the breach of Article 5 in particular can be made, if they cannot be then it would mean that when individuals are detained in a state outside of the jurisdiction of the UK. Although if claims were allowed to be brought against UK authorities. Reiterating the issue that if not within UK jurisdiction, there may well be a breach but because they’re not in a state which is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR or one of the exceptions of territorial reach, they will not be able to give rise to claim. It could be seen to offer less protection of civil liberties in UK legislation, than previous legislation, in particular the 2011 Act. In relation to TEO’s if the UK is imposing these measures under UK legislation, then surely the law governing the individual should be subject to the ECHR as the UK is a member of the ECHR, and not allow circumstances where they may potentially evade these obligations.

The obligation of ECHR states to uphold those ‘absolute rights’[45] has remained imperative, and has been illustrated in the 2015 Act. Article 3 in specific, this is the right in relation to torture, there is absolutely no circumstance in which states can seek a compromise with the individual’s rights and state security. This was illustrated in the case of Chahal[46] where the UK’s wish to deport the individual was denied due to the risk of the treatment on his return, that would be contrary to Article 3. The 2015 Act allows for the secretary of state to issue a permit to return to the UK without an actual application being made, this applies to urgent situations, S.7[47] sets this out. Urgent situations would cover circumstances where there is a risk of an individuals Article 3 being breached. Showing that even with this heightened strength of powers related to anti-terrorism measures, Article 3 is still protected within legislation, relaying the importance of protecting these ‘absolute rights’[48] to its fullest. These TEO measures will also draw attention to Article 8, in terms of human rights. Obviously, by not allowing a person to return to Britain will stop them from reuniting with family, therefore may seen to be in Breach of Article 8, the right to a private and family life. Again there is an exception if it is for the prevention of national security, Article 8(2). The length of time the person was to be prevented from returning would be the focus on determining a necessary breach, similar to previous legislation.

Similarities can be drawn between temporary exclusion orders and the powers under Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, crime and security Act 2001, which was repealed after heavy criticism about the incompatibly with the ECHR. Part four of the 2001 Act allowed for actions relating to deportation and refusing leave to enter the UK or remain, s.22 of the 2001 sets out these actions. Chahal[49] illustrates that if there is risk of inhumane treatment contrary to Article then they cannot be deported, Part 4 then allows for indefinite detention, s.23, if the individual cannot be deported. This received much criticism in relation to human rights, in addition Part four required derogation. Arguably this new legislation has reversed some of the change legislation has brought about to attempt to account for the infringement on human rights. If the 2001 Act required derogation it was clear that there was much infringement on human rights, enough to call for derogation, if comparisons can be drawn between the 2001 Act and the 2015 Act then there must be concerns about the level of infringement on human rights. However much of the criticism from the previous legislation,2001 Act, came about because it allowed foreign national’[50] to be singled out.

Conclusion

With the continuing elevation of risk from terrorism, it is the governments upmost priority to ensure the safety of its citizens, Article 2 of the ECHR protects peoples right to life. At the same time there must be some level of protection for those rights of individuals who may be subject to the governments powers. It is clear from the string of legislation passed since 2000[51], that the government has faced much difficulty striking a balance which both satisfies the need for public safety and the need to protect those rights of individuals under the ECHR. Looking at the Counter terrorism and security act 2015 an evaluation can be made as to the implications anti-terrorism legislation has on human rights.

Firstly, it can be argued that the government has clearly ceased in progression, and in some places made it worse on those individual human rights. Using previous legislation for comparison, the reinstatement of the relocation aspect of TPIM’s has shown a reversal in the balancing of individual human rights. The 2005 Act[52] allowed for relocation, however it was decided for reasons including human rights, to remove this aspect along with other changes in the 2011 Act[53]. The 2011 Act was introduced by the coalition government in an attempt to balance those rights. The 2011 Act was preferable to the 2005 Act by the JCHR[54], the 2015 Act has just essentially undone what the 2011 Act had done in relation to relocation, which may cause concern in terms of human right as the governments position is showing less concern for those individual human rights.

Moreover, travel exclusion orders enhance the powers of the state against individuals, at the expense of more interference with certain human rights, as they stop the individual from re-entering the country, which is a clear interference with Article 8, the right to family and private life. With the heightened threat level of terrorism, it is more readily justified. The lack of clarity creates problems, especially with jurisdiction. This would have severe negative implications for human rights under the ECHR. With the threat of terrorism increasing, it is unlikely that the government is going to be as concerned with protecting the right of those individuals that fall subject to measures imposed, this is made clear in the 2015 Act[55]. This is understandable as it is the public safety at risk. But it is important to ensure the government when trying to ensure security does so ‘without permanently compromising our civil liberties’[56] .With recent events, especially one occurring in London[57] it is very likely that legislation is going to be brought forward extending powers again, which is likely to be at the expense of human rights. It could add credibility to the statement ‘after every terrorist attack, governments respond with ever more repressive laws, tearing up civil liberties in the search for greater security’[58].

However there is evidence to show that the government has improved the protection offered to individual human rights within the 2015 Act[59]. In relation to the changes in the TPIM’s, the burden of proof changing from reasonable suspicion to the balance of probabilities[60], offers more protection for individuals who may be falsely accused, as they are less likely to be made subject to a TPMI if the burden of proof required by the secretary if state is higher. In addition, the extension of the power to seize passports to police and border authorities, offers an alternative to detention to prevent travel. Interference on Article 8 of the ECHR is far less substantial, than what it would be if the person was detained. Even thought the seizing of someone’s passport still would interfere with Article 8, it would be to a lesser extent, showing progress towards balancing the two sides. But there are concerns with interference with the Article 6 right of a fair trial.

 Looking at the recent legislation it does offer more in terms of protection in human rights than its predecessors. For example Part IV of the 2001 act[61] allowed for ‘indefinite detention’ on the grounds of ‘reasonable suspicion’ without charge or trial, this was clearly in violation of  the ‘the right to liberty’ Article 5 of the ECHR. Or S.44 of the Anti Terrorism Act 2000 which allowed stop and search powers without reasonable suspicion. Considering the previous measures, it is obvious that recent anti-terror legislation does not have as serious implications against human rights as previous legislation. The changing legislation has shown that the government has attempted to protect individual human rights, however the most recent legislation has not shown this, with the enhancing of powers, and introduction of new measures, Travel exclusion orders. Overall it seems that the 2015 Act has had mostly negative implications on human individual human right, interfering more with people’s rights under the ECHR. But in certain aspects the implications have been improved offering more protection for individual human rights, this however is limited. 

Bibliography

Cases

UK Cases

A v Secretary of state for the home department [2004] UKHL 56

CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court), [2011] 1273 EWCH

ECHR cases

Chahal v United Kingdom [1997] E.H.R.R, 25, European Court of Human Rights.

Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (2011) ECtHR,

Statute

UK statute

 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001

Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015

Human Rights Act 1989

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005

Terrorism Act 2000

Terrorism Prevention and Investigative Measures Act 2011

 ECHR Statute

European Convention On human Rights 1950

Official Materials

Human Rights Joint Committee – Fifth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, HL Paper 86, HC 859, published 12 January 2015

Counter terrorism and Security Bill, European convention on Human Rights, Memorandum by the Home office

The Counter Terrorism and security Act 2015, explanatory notes

Council of Europe’s Additional protocol to the council of Europe Convention on the prevention of Terrorism 12 March 2015

Theresa May, review of counter terrorism and security powers, 2011, reviews and recommendations

David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) ‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013’ Second Report March 2014

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Walker C, Terrorism and the law (Oxford University Press 2011)

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Honeywood. C.A., 2016. Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with Human Rights. Journal of Strategic Security

Blackbourn J and Walker C, ‘Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism And Security Act 2015’ (2016) 79 The Modern Law Review

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[1]Bruce A. Ackerman Before the next attack: preserving civil liberties in an age of terrorism (New Haven, Yale University Press 2006) p 70.

[2] European Convention On Human Rights 1950

[3] David McKeever ‘Terrorism Act 2000’ [2010] P.L. page number

[4] David Mckeever ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK: one great leap forward by Parliament, but are the courts able to slow the steady retreat that has followed?’ [2010] P.L.

[5] Clive Walker, Terrorism and the law (Oxford University Press 2011)p21.Oxford University Press 2011)p21.verit

[6] Chahal v United Kingdom [1997] E.H.R.R, 25, European Court of Human Rights. Page 25.

[7] Ibid page 25.

[8] Clive Walker, (n 9) p21

[9] Ibid p21

[10] ibid p21

[11] The Counter Terrorism and security Act 2015, explanatory notes, Para 6.

[12] The Counter Terrorism and security Act 2015, explanatory notes, para 6.

[13] The Terrorism prevention and investigative measures Act 2011

[14]The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Section 16(2)(b)

[15] Ibid above S.16(3) (3A)

[16] Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005

[17] CD v Secretary of State for the Home Department Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court), [2011] 1273 EWCH para 55.

[18]Ibid Para 55.

[19] David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) ‘Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures in 2013’ Second Report March 2014 p.57.

[20] Human Rights Joint Committee – Fifth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, HL Paper 86, HC 859, published 12 January 2015, para 4.10.

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid

[23] Theresa May, review of counter terrorism and security powers, 2011, reviews and recommendations, Page 4

[24] Council of Europe’s Additional protocol to the council of Europe Convention on the prevention of Terrorism 12 March 2015, Article 1.

[25] Counter Terrorism and Security Bill, ECHR Memorandum by the Home Office Paragraph 19

[26] Counter terrorism and security Act 2015, S.20 (1)

[27]The Counter terrorism and security Act 2015, S.1.

[28] Helen Fenwick ‘Responding to the ISIS threat: extending coercive non- trial-based measures in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015’(2016) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, page 181

[29] The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015

[30] Jessie Blackbourn and Clive Walker, ‘Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism And Security Act 2015’ (2016) 79 The Modern Law Review page 847

[31] Ibid page 847

[32] Helen Fenwick ‘Responding to the ISIS threat: extending coercive non- trial-based measures in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015’(2016) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, page 181.

[33] HONEYWOOD, C.A., 2016. Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with Human Rights. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3), pp. 28-48.

[34] The Counter Terrorism and security Act 2015 S.1

[35] A v Secretary of state for the home department [2004] UKHL 56 paragraph 237.

[36] Counter terrorism and Security Bill, European convention on Human Rights, Memorandum by the Home office, paragraph 3.

[37] The Counter terrorism and security act 2015 s.2(1)

[38] The Counter terrorism and security act 2015, S.2(3)

[39] Helen Fenwick (refer to footnote 33) page 177

[40] Terrorism Prevention and investigation measures Act 2011.

[41] Ibid

[42]Helen Fenwick (n 33) page 178

[43] Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (2011), ECHR para 134

[44]Helen Fenwick (n 33) page 179

[45] Clive Walker, Terrorism and the law (Oxford University Press 2011)p21

[46]Chahal  (Refer to footnote 42) paragraph 489

[47] Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s.7

[48] Clive Walker (refer footnote 9) p21

[49] Helen Fenwick (Refer to footnote 43)

[50] A v Secretary of state for the home department [2004] UKHL 56, Para 237.

[51] Terrorism Act 2000

[52] Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 2011 and the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015

[53] Terrorism prevention and investigation Measures Act 2011

[54] Human Rights Joint Committee – Fifth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, HL Paper 86, HC 859, published 12 January 2015, para 4.10.

[55] Counter terrorism and security Act 2015.

[56] Ackerman B, Before the next attack, New Statesman, 2006, p39.

[57] BBC, London Attack: Two killed in Westminster ‘Terror’ incident (22 March 2017) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39355940

[58] Ackerman B, Before the next attack, New Statesman, 2006, p39.

[59] Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015

[60] Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 s.20

[61] Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Part VI