Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act : Grenfell Tower

Introduction

The tragic fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, resulting in the deaths of seventy-two innocent residents, arguably marks the most significant catastrophe in recent decades to bring to light the issues of corporate criminal liability and corporate manslaughter.[1] In the last few decades, other national disasters involving corporations, most notably, the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry calamity in 1987 and the Southall rail disaster in 1997 amongst others, have prompted the government to take action in response to the frustration of the public and the media at the perceived injustice of corporations and large organisations eluding convictions for deaths caused by their gross failings.[2] Prior to the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA), in order for a company to be found guilty of corporate manslaughter, under common law, a director or senior manager of the said company had to be found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.[3] This dependence upon the identification principle, an individual-centric model requiring the personal culpability through the identification of the “controlling mind” of a company was problematic when attempting to prosecute large corporations with complex management structures. [4]

The government’s response to the problems manifested itself in the form of a Law Commission report in 1996 and subsequently the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act in 2007.[5] The Act received Royal Assent on 26 July 2007 and came into force a year later in April 2008.[6] It was therefore envisaged that the Act would facilitate the ascription of criminal liability to corporations and large organisations and thus lead to a notable increase in the number of particularly larger companies being successfully convicted under its provisions. More than ten years after the enactment of the Act, the Grenfell Tower disaster is likely to put the provisions of the Act to test in an unprecedented way and this process in turn will be key in evincing whether the Act can succeed in facilitating the successful conviction of large companies for corporate manslaughter. [7]

Chapter One provides an evaluation of the background of the law in relation to corporate manslaughter through the examination of two of the most notable cases that contributed to a cultural shift in the perception of corporate criminal liability and accelerated the government’s re-evaluation of the legal position of corporate manslaughter, namely, the Herald Free Enterprise disaster and the Great Western Railway train crash.[8] The failed prosecution of both corporations in these two cases in particular were key in bringing to the fore the law’s inadequacy to prosecute large companies.[9] This has been primarily deemed to be due to the nature of the identification principle which, firstly required the identification of a distinguishable individual personally culpable for the gross breach and secondly, for this person to be the controlling mind of the said breach.[10] 

Chapter Two critically analyses the Act, in particular section 1(1) which discusses the way in which an organisation’s activities are managed or organised, section 1(3) which requires the operation of such activities to be carried out by the senior management and for this to constitute a substantial element in the breach and section 1(4) which subsequently aims to explain the senior management element.[11] This will be examined in order to demonstrate that the absence of a detailed explanation of these terms and the lack of guidance in respect of them generate uncertainty and render the application of these provisions to corporations and public bodies difficult.[12]Chapter Three considers how the lack of clarity in these stipulations are likely to complicate the prosecution of the numerous large companies and public bodies which were involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower and the tragedy that caused multiple deaths.[13] This paper concludes that the tragedy at Grenfell Tower and the divergent entities involved in the Tower’s refurbishment form part of unprecedented circumstances which will put the Act’s provisions to test. Concluding from the application of the statutory provisions on the case law to date, it would appear unlikely that the Act will be able to significantly facilitate the prosecution of large corporations and public entities for corporate manslaughter as it was intended to do. However, it is probable that should indictments against organisations involved in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment go to trial, these will hopefully provide much needed guidance in respect of the application of the Act’s provisions to large organsations.

CHAPTER ONE

The unsuccessful prosecutions of the companies involved in the disasters of the Herald Free Enterprise and the Southall train crash are perceived as key demonstrators of the inadequacy of the preceding provisions when previously attempting to prosecute corporations, particularly large companies, for corporate manslaughter.[14] Significant public condemnation and notable media attention followed the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry in March 1987 off the Zeebrugge harbour after it had left its bow doors open, resulting in the deaths of 192 people.[15] A decade later, the Southall rail crash prompted further censure from the public and ran parallel to the increasingly prevalent consensus amongst legal and political commentators that the then legal provisions in place for the prosecution of the gross negligence of large corporations were patently inadequate and that a radical reform was required.[16]

The charges brought against P&O ferries in 1991 heralded the first time that a judge ruled that the law recognised manslaughter as a charge that could be brought against a corporation.[17] However, despite this, the judge eventually directed acquittals, enabling the company to evade prosecution.[18] As will be demonstrated, the acquittals were mainly due to the failure of the prosecution to establish the required “controlling mind” of the company’s actions carried out by an identifiable individual who could constitute as the human embodiment of the company and therefore be held as wholly culpable for the company’s gross negligence.[19] Indeed, the judge relied on the ruling in Tesco Supermarket Ltd v Nattrass [1971?] to reach his decision to cease further proceedings against the company.[20] Tesco v Nattrass developed the identification doctrine – at 170E, Lord Reid summarises the crux of the principle [italics are my emphasis]:

A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company. [21]

This anthropomorphic view of a company’s management structure similarly contributed to the failed prosecution in the Southall rail crash disaster where the identification doctrine established in Tesco v Nattrass still applied.[22] The fatal collision which occurred on 19 September 1997 on the 10:32 GWT-operated train from Swansea to Paddington resulted in the deaths of seven people, leaving a further 139 people with serious injuries.[23] Although the company was eventually fined £1.5 million, as with the P&O disaster, the prosecution for manslaughter against the GWT was unsuccessful. In the case of the Southall rail crash, the Attorney-General directed the case on a point of law to the Court of Appeal, marking the first time that an appeal court examined the law on corporate manslaughter and following the determination of which the Government accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission of the establishment of a corporate killing offence. [24]

Before the CMCHA 2007, the perceived primary difficulty with the application of the identification doctrine on corporations lay with the complications presented by the necessary establishment of the causal link between the grossly negligent act and the “controlling mind” responsible for it.[25] Indeed, the prosecution had to prove two things: firstly, that a single individual was responsible for the gross negligence manslaughter and secondly, that this person was the “controlling mind” of the company.[26]Thus, if the evidence against the individual with the “controlling mind” is insufficient, the prosecution against the company would also be rendered non-existent.^[27]The identification of a single “controlling mind” behind the key decision-making responsible for the gross negligent act is viable in a small corporation with a straightforward management structure where the managers/directors are easily identifiable.[28] However, with medium or large corporations where the management chain is ordinarily complex and tiered with multiple influences on key decisions from several individuals, the determination of a singular person largely responsible for the critical decision in question is seldom possible to ascertain.[29] Another notably manifest difficulty in assigning responsibility for a managerial or procedural failure is the fact that personnel frequently change within larger corporations thus making it particularly difficult to establish full responsibility when staff changes take place and especially so when such erroneous decisions are cumulative.[30] It is, therefore, hardly surprising that before the cases Herald of Free Enterprise and the Southall rail crash and even during the period of time between the two cases, that only two companies were convicted of manslaughter and even more tellingly, that both were small companies with easily distinguishable management structures.

The difficulties brought to light in prosecuting large corporations in the Herald Free Enterprise disaster and the Southall rail crash cases prompted the Law Commission’s Report (CM 237?) in 1996 entitled “Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter” and comprised proposals for a new offence of corporate killing directed exclusively at the prosecution of corporations to supplement the existing provisions directed at individuals.[31] The report also formed the foundations for a paper in 2000 entitled “Reforming the law on Involuntary Manslaughter: the Government’s Proposals” and a draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill (CM 6497) published in 2005.[32] The 2000 consultation paper further prompted the eventually unsuccessful Corporate Homicide Bill (No.114) in April 2000 with the aim of introducing a new offence of corporate killing.[33]

The Government’s long-awaited substantive response to the 1996 Law Commission report materialised seven years later with the Corporate Manslaughter Bill 2005 which set out the proposals for a specific offence of corporate manslaughter.[34] The rationale behind the 2005 Bill was also to finally address the problems presented [by the application of the] “controlling mind” and personal culpability requirements of the identification doctrine on corporations. However, as noted by L.Watkins, the supposed reform of the elements of the identification doctrine where the requirement of a “directing mind” of the decision is replaced by the management of the activities of “senior management”, is much less an elimination of the identification principle and more a re-packaging of the same doctrine.[35] 

CHAPTER TWO

Chapter Two will argue that despite the recognition of the need for clarification in a 2005-06 Joint Report, when the final draft was published and the Act came into force in 2007, these sections remained unchanged. This lack of clarity and absence of direction in relation to senior management element is likely to cause difficulties when attempting to prosecute the type of sizeable entities involved in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment. Further, a comparable lack of guidance in respect of the Act’s provisions directed towards public bodies, specifically in respect of duty of care and causation, will also pose challenges when applying the provisions to public authorities.Since the CMCHA came into force, the number of successful prosecutions for companies under the Act as of [April] 2018 stand at twenty-three.[36] An analysis of the pertinent sections of the Act may elucidate some reasons for the low conviction rate. Indeed, academics, among them Richard A. Matthews,[37] have commented on the deficiency of guidance and clarity on the provisions of the Act, with Gerard Forlin Forlin QC noting that “we are still a long way from knowing what many of the CMCHA 2007 main provisions actually mean”.[38] Indeed, even from the initial stages of the Act’s formation, namely, the publication of the first draft Bill in 2005 (Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill CM 6497) which prompted a joint committee of the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees to produce a report – the First Joint Report from the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees Session 2005-06 (HC540), which subsequently examined the provisions in the Act in detail and identified that parts of the Act which required further amendment and clarification, [39] including the senior management element itself in section 1(3) and its definition in section 1(4).[40]

S 1.(1) states that “An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised — (a) causes a person’s death, and (b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased.”[41] S.1(1) of the Act removes the requirement of the identification of a sole accountable individual behind the decision-making, section 1. (3) nonetheless states that an organisation is guilty of the offence “only if the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial breach referred to in subsection 1.”[42] In section 1(1), “way” is sufficiently broad to include any relevant decisions, acts and omissions both lawful and unlawful.[43] The determination of whether the way in which an organisation’s management of activities caused death is based on the general principles of causation in criminal law and is a fact for a jury to determine.[44] As Jeremy Horder perceptively notes, the employment of “way” broadens the applicability to corporation by addressing the previous issue of aggregation as it permits the jury to consider the organisation’s conduct in a holistic manner.[45]

However, the subsequent requirement for the way of these activities to be managed or organised by “senior management” arguably restricts the possible wider applicability of the first part of the provision.[46] The previous common law approach to corporate criminal liability was chiefly deficient due the narrowly restrictive nature of the identification doctrine. It was thus envisaged that the CMCHA would widen the attribution of criminal liability of corporations.[47] Indeed, the requirement in the CMCHA for the way the in which the organisation’s activities are managed or organised to be carried out by its “senior management” was included with the anticipation that it would eliminate the difficulties prevalent under the identification doctrine.[48] However, as Steve Tombs rightly maintains, although section (1)3 provides a senior management test, it does not provide any further clarification, direction or guidance as to exactly who or what constitutes “senior management”. [49] 

Further, combined with the difficulties discussed above in applying the Act’s provisions in sections 1 (1), 1 (3) and 1 (4) in respect of senior management, the application of the Act’s provisions in relation to public bodies poses further difficulties. Section 1 (2) of the Act stipulates that “the organisations to which the offence applies to includes a department or other body listed in Schedule 1 (section 1(2) (b)).”^[50] Whilst there is an inclusion of public authorities as institutions capable of liability under the Act in Section 1(2) and Section 1 (2) (b) detailing that this includes “a department or other body listed in Schedule 1”[51] Section 3 limits their liability by restricting the duty of care in respect of public authorities: “Any duty of care owed by a public authority in respect of a decision as to matters of public policy (including in particular the allocation of public resources or the weighing of competing public interests) is not a “relevant duty of care” as stipulated in Section 2 of the Act. [52] Jeremy Horder critiques the Act’s provisions in relation to public bodies as consisting of severe limitations.[53] Indeed, all of the organisations that have been charged with offences under the CMCHA have been companies save for the R v Dr Errol Cornish, Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust which involved a pubic body. [54]However, this case was ultimately dismissed by Judge Coulson on the basis that there was no case to answer.[55]

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter Three will firstly examine how the difficulties analysed in Chapter Two in identifying the senior management of a large organisation are likely to pose challenges when attempting to apply the Act’s provisions to the organisations with complex, multi-levelled management structures involved in Grenfell Tower’s refurbishment.[56] Secondly, an assessment will be made of the potential challenges likely to arise from the application of the Act’s provisions to the public authorities, primarily the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council (RBKC) and the Tenant Management Organisation, for their role in the Tower’s refurbishment.[57] The analysis of these two considerations will further underline the notable shortfalls in the Act as discussed in Chapter Two will examine how combined with the low number of cases where the Act has been employed to date, the probable trajectory for the Act will have to be applied unprecedented application should prosecutions materialise against numerous organisations involved in the case of Grenfell Tower.[58]

The senior management test under sections 1(3) and 1 (4)(c) which stipulates that “senior management”, in relation to an organisation, means the persons who play significant roles in— (i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised, or (ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities”,[59]whilst a welcome development from the identification doctrine under the common law, provides very little guidance as to how these provisions are to be applied to large organisations. For instance, the evaluation of the persons who play significant roles in the decision-making process and what exactly constitutes a substantial part can be difficult to ascertain in organisations with multiple levels of decision-making. These elements are likely to be particularly problematic when attempting to apply them to sizeable orgnaisations with multi-layered, complex management structures. Further, the case law to date has provided little assistance with the senior management element in the Act.

Indeed, Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd, the first company to be successfully prosecuted under CMCHA 2007, comprised only eight employees.[60] The case did not even require direct application of the senior management test since Mr Eaton was “the sole director of the company… He was in total control of the way in which its affairs were managed and in which the work was organised.”[61] The prosecution of R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Limited, a small company with a vertical, easily identifiable management structure is indicative of the subsequent companies that have been prosecuted under the Act, including Lion Steel Equipment Limited and J Murray & Son Limited, both companies with 11-50 employees.[62]

However, five years after R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Limited, the prosecution of CAV Aerospace, a medium-large company of over 500 employees, has signalled a more promising direction for the applicability of the Act’s provisions for larger organisations with more complex management structures.[63] As Howard Fidderman notes, the vast majority of the convictions under CMCHA before CAV Aerospace involved companies where there was an easily distinguishable managing or senior director in a small company.[64] The conviction of CAV Aerospace, with an annual turnover in excess of £73 million in 2013, also marked the first[65] time that the prosecution was against a parent company rather than the subsidiary company itself despite the incident taking place in the subsidiary’s premises.[66]The company was fined £600,000 and a full trial was undertaken as well as an extensive examination made of the role of individuals in the context of the accumulative and collective failures of the senior management.[67] R v CAV Aerospace, deviated away from the singular directing mind principle under the identification doctrine, where Detective Constable Simon Albrow, leader of the Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire Major Crime Unit working in conjunction with the HSE stated that: “We came to the conclusion that no single person was to blame for [the] death.”[68] This is demonstrative of the change away from the identification doctrine.

Further, the size of CAV Aerospace, its status as a parent company with subsidiary[ies] is promising and may provide the courts with some guidance as to the application of the Act in relation to the numerous organisations, contractors and companies involved in the Tower’s refurbishment project. Indeed, 336 organisations in total, of varying sizes were in some capacity involved in the refurbishment, construction or management of Grenfell Tower.[69] Out of these, nine have so far been considered as the main contractors and sub-contractors.[70] Rydon, the lead contractor of the project, employs more than 750 people and[71] Artelia UK who had the role of project manager has 105 employees. Evidently, the assessment of senior management in sizeable companies like Rydon and Artelia UK themselves is likely to present challenges.

Indeed, the acquittals in Herald of Free Enterprise were partly due to the fact that the faults of the defendants could not be aggregated. Therefore, although the individuals implicated [acted recklessly?], an overall assessment of the company’s reckless disregard for safety could not be established. Indeed [Jeremy Horder notes that had the Herald of Free Enterprise case been tried under the CMCHA 2007, it is likely that the issue of aggregation would have been resolved by virtue of section [18] of CMCHA . Such that although the requirement for the actions to be carried out by senior management would have presented notable difficulties in that it is unlikely that the assistant bosun in charge of shutting the bow doors and the chief office responsible for ensuring that the bow doors were shut would have been considered as part of the senior management since they did not play a significant role in the making of decisions, [72] the availability of aggregation – makes it more likely that the company would have been convicted. [73]

A further challenge is likely to be the assessment of the relationship between the different organisations involved in the refurbishment as well as the division of responsibilities amongst the companies and contractors and the local authority organisations, namely, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation in order to ascertain the role of each organisation in the Tower’s refurbishment. [74]Not only is the assessment of the senior management element within each organisation likely to be difficult and problematic but so is the assessment of the culpability of local authorities. Indeed, all the entities that have been charged with offences under the CMCHA so far have been companies except for R v Dr Errol Cornish, Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust as discussed above, involving an NHS Trust body that ultimately ended in an acquittal. [75] One of the main difficulties that may arise in prosecuting local authorities is the sentencing and the issue of who will ultimately be responsible for the payment of the fine i.e. the taxpayer. Justice Coulson’s comments in R v Dr Errol Cornish, Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, regarding the relationship between the publicly funded NHS Trust and the Crown Prosecution Service are instructive.Moreover, a further complicating factor is the fact that charges that have so far been brought under the Act have primarily focused on individual losses of life as opposed to multiple deaths, with R v MNS Mining as the only case to date where there have been multiple deaths (4), however, this case resulted in an acquittal.

 In November 2015, the Sentencing Council produced new sentencing guidelines following a review of the sentencing under the CMCHA where the provisions were deemed too moderate.[76] Therefore, even if prosecutions against large corporations are brought forward, the sentencing provisions stipulated in the Act may not be deemed as sufficient punishment, by those who have been directly affected by the tragedy.^[77] Whilst, the Sentencing Guidelines provides helpful directions as to the calculation of the fines, previous cases have demonstrated that this will nonetheless be a difficult exercise for the judges.^[78]This is primarily due to the difficulty presented in harmonising an appropriately high-level fine with the recommendation in the Sentencing Guidelines where paragraph 19 stipulates that the court ought to consider whether the fine will result in putting the company out of business.^[79]That said, the Guidelines also assert that in some circumstances putting the company out of business would be an acceptable consequence.[80] The Sentencing Guidelines also set out aggravating and mitigating factors which would affect the sentence provides some guidance as to when it may be acceptable for the fine to be so substantial as to put the organisation out of business.[81]The aggravating factors which may prove to be relevant in relation to Grenfell Tower may include 7 (a) more than one death; 7 (b) failure to heed warnings or advice amongst others.[82] However given the gravity and scale of the tragedy, it may be that the judge, as Mr Justice Beatson and Mr Justice Bean asserted in R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Limited, may view the resulting demise of the company/ companies following the imposition of large fines as a necessary consequence of the harm caused. [83]

From the convictions under the CMCHA to date, it is evident that, as anticipated, the Act complements existing provisions under the Health and Safety Act at work 1974. Thus, it is unsurprising perhaps that most of the companies who have been convicted under the Act, have also been charged under Health and Safety. [84] As stated by Judge Gilbart QC, it was envisaged that the CMCHA would complement and work alongside other mechanisms in place in which accountability for gross breaches were established including gross negligent manslaughter and the breaches of duties under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. [85] As such, as was considered in twenty out of thirty-one of the convictions, it is probable that those parties involved in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment will also face charges under the Health and Safety Act 1974.  [86]

CONCLUSION

Although it is manifest that the Act widens the net of liability from the previous existing provisions under common law, the absence of clear explanations, directions and guidance as to its key provisions and the uncertainty that these engender, render the successful conviction of the organisations for which this Act was specifically created, difficult indeed. Once the Grenfell Tower Inquiry has concluded, the likelihood of subsequent prosecutions brought forward against the parties involved in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower is evidently high but the question of whether the Act will succeed in successful convictions is debatable and remains to be seen.[87]

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[1]Owen Bowcott and Amelia Gentleman, ‘Grenfell labelled a ‘national atrocity’ as lawyers begin giving evidence’ (The Guardian, 11 December 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/11/grenfell-tower-police-investigating-corporate-manslaughter-offences > accessed 6 July 2018.

[2] Stephen Griffin, ‘Corporate Manslaughter: A Radical Reform?’ (2007) JCL 71 151, 151.

[3] Rhys Griffiths and Guy Burman, ‘Corporate Manslaughter: An Update’ (2007) CSR 20, 153.

[4]Steve Tombs, ‘The UK’s corporate killing law: Un/ fit for purpose?’(2017) 1-18 http://oro.open.ac.uk/50458/3/50458.pdf accessed 15 June 2018.

[5] L. Watkins, ‘Much Ado About Nothing (The Corporate Manslaughter Bill), (2005) JPN 169, 488.

[6] Gerard Forlin and Louise Small, Corporate Liability: Work Related Deaths and Criminal Prosecutions (with specialist contributors Bloomsbury Professional, 3^rd edn, 2014) 5.

[7] Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 2007 – A 10-Year Review’ (2018), JCL 82, 48.

[8] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001), 106.

[9]Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001), Ch 6.

[10] L. Watkins, ‘Much Ado About Nothing (The Corporate Manslaughter Bill), (2005) JPN 169, 489.

[11] Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, section 1.

[12] Celia Wells, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: a Ten Year Review’ (2014), Crim. L.R.4, 12, 849-878.

[13] https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/steve-tombs-and-david-whyte/on-grenfell-one-law-for-rich-one-poor accessed 7 July 2018.

[14] Practical Law Business Crime and Investigations, ‘Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007’ https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-376-0094?originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&comp=pluk accessed 10 June 2018.

[15] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 107; Jeremy Horder – 124-126.

[16] Rhys Griffiths and Guy Burman, ‘Corporate Manslaughter: An Update’ (2007) CSR 20, 153.

[17] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 106.

[18]Jeremy Horder, Homicide and the politics of law reform (Oxford University Press, 2012) 124-126

[19] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 106.

[20] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 107.

[21] Tesco v Nattrass, Lord Reid 170. 

[22]Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 112.

[23]Professor John Uff QC FREng. ‘The Southall Rail Accident Inquiry Report’ http://www.epcresilience.com/EPC/media/MediaLibrary/Knowledge%20Hub%20Documents/F%20Inquiry%20Reports/Southall-Rail-(2000).pdf?ext=.pdf accessed 10 June 2018.

[24] Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 107.

[25] Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 2007 – A 10-Year Review’ (2018), JCL 82, 49-52.

[26] Ibid 49-52.

[27] Pinsent Masons, ‘Corporate Manslaughter’ (Pinsent Masons, 1 February 2010) https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/corporate/health-and-safety-and-corporate-manslaughter1/corporate-manslaughter/  accessed 7 July 2018.

[28] Reference

[29]Stephen Griffin article?

[30] https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/corporate/health-and-safety-and-corporate-manslaughter1/corporate-manslaughter/ (6 July)

[31]Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2^nd edn, Oxford University Press 2001) 106.

[32]http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/WN_Corporate_Killing_Sept_05.pdf; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/notes/division/3 – accessed 27.12

[33] http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/WN_Corporate_Killing_Sept_05.pdf – accessed 27 December

[34] Blackstone 92-94 ; https://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/draftbillcorporateman.pdf

[35] L. Watkins, ‘Much Ado About Nothing (The Corporate Manslaughter Bill), (2005) JPN 169, 488 – 492.(page 4.

[36]https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-618-1015?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1&OWSessionId=02529eddc3ff44abbb1c2cccc7cc893b&skipAnonymous=true – accessed 24.06.18

[37] Steve Tombs article, https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/steve-tombs-and-david-whyte/on-grenfell-one-law-for-rich-one-poor accessed 29 December 2017.

[37] Blackstone – 90

[38] Page 9 – Corporate Liability and Work – Related deaths

[39] Blackstone 33: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/540/540i.pdf accessed 24.06.2018 – page 41.

[40] Blackstone – page 33.

[41] The Act, sections 1(3), 1(4).  

[42] CMCHA 2007 c.19

[43] Blackstone 100

[44] 97-98 – Blackstone

[45] Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform – 127 – Jeremy Horder

[46] REFERENCE – repackage article.

[47] Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 2007 – A 10-Year Review’ (2018), JCL 82, 48. Page 4.

[48] Ibid, 7, Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 2007 – A 10-Year Review’ (2018), JCL 82, 48. Page 4.

[49] http://oro.open.ac.uk/50458/3/50458.pdf – page 4 – accessed – 11^th November 2017.

[50] The Act – page 1 – https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19/pdfs/ukpga_20070019_en.pdf

[51] The Act, page 3

[52] The Act

[53] Jeremy Horder

[54] http://readinglists.northumbria.ac.uk/page/summary-of-corporate-manslaughter-cases-april-2017.html

[55] R v Dr Errol Cornish, Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust – 2016 – paragraph 62.

[56] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/long-builder-chain-for-grenfell-a-safety-and-accountability-issue 8 July 2018.

[57] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/grenfell-tower-fire-latest-news-corporate-manslaughter-kensington-council-kctmo-met-police-a7863616.html – accessed 4 July 2018

[58] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/long-builder-chain-for-grenfell-a-safety-and-accountability-issue 8 July 2018.

[59] The Act

[60] Case itelf

[61] R v Cotswolds – para 3

[62] Reference – cases themselves?

[63] Sarah Field – Criminal Liability under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: a Changing Landscape, 2016 – page 4 – maybe find a better reference for the facts of CAV? E.g. the case itself! CHECK THIS!

[64] Howard Fidderman REFERENCE

[65] Corporate Manslaughter: the most important case to date – Howard Fidderman – 442 HSB 9. 1 October 2015. Page 1.

[66]Surely same reference as above.

[67] Corporate Manslaughter: the most important case to date – Howard Fidderman – 442 HSB 9. 1 October 2015. Page 2.

[68] Corporate Manslaughter: the most important case to date – Howard Fidderman – 442 HSB 9. 1 October 2015. Page 2.

[69] Tolley’s Health and Safety at Work (Journal) /2018/Issue 1, January/Articles/As we leave 2017 behind … 2018 takes shape ahead – Tolley’s Health and Safety at Work, January 2018, 18 – Chris Warburton. Page 2.

[70] Guardian Article – accessed 31 December. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/long-builder-chain-for-grenfell-a-safety-and-accountability-issue –

[71] https://www.ft.com/content/9096dde8-5826-11e7-80b6-9bfa4c1f83d2 accessed 31 December 2017.

[72] 126 – Jeremy Horder – Corporate Manslaughter and Public Authorities – book

[73] 127 jeremy horder

[74] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/15/long-builder-chain-for-grenfell-a-safety-and-accountability-issue accessed 5 July 2018.

[75]http://readinglists.northumbria.ac.uk/page/summary-of-corporate-manslaughter-cases-april-2017.html

[76] International Company and Commercial Law Review 2016 Criminal liability under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: a changing landscape Sarah Field. Accessed 31.12. Page 1.

[77] https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/45054/Grenfell%3A+corporate+manslaughter+charges+are+not+enough accessed 7 July 2018.

[78] Reference

[79] https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web__guideline_on_corporate_manslaughter_accessible.pdf accessed 23.06.2018 – paragraph 19 viii. Page 10.

[80] Ibid, relevant section.

[81] Ibid, relevant section.

[82]https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web__guideline_on_corporate_manslaughter_accessible.pdf accessed 8 July 2018.

[83]R v Cotswold Geotechnical – 2011

[84] LexisNexis, ‘Corporate Manslaughter—Prosecutions Tracker’ (LexisNexis) https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/corporatecrime/document/391423/5KPS-S621-F188-31MG-00000-00/Corporate%20manslaughter%E2%80%94prosecutions%20tracker 2 July 2018.

[85] https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/hhj-gilbart-qc-sentence-remarksr-v-lion-steel.pdf – [17], 2 June 2018.

[86]LexisNexis, ‘Corporate Manslaughter—Prosecutions Tracker’ (LexisNexis) https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/corporatecrime/document/391423/5KPS-S621-F188-31MG-00000-00/Corporate%20manslaughter%E2%80%94prosecutions%20tracker 2 July 2018.

[87] Victoria Roper, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 2007 – A 10-Year Review’ (2018), JCL 82, 48.