Reasons for and Application of Rules of Statutory Interpretation

The primary aim of this essay is to explain the reasons and application of rules of statutory interpretation. The secondary aim of this essay is to examine the quote that “they are rather crude labels for describing a complex mechanism, i.e. making sense of what someone else has written. The labels are still in common use, but they are dangerous. For a start, they use the word ‘rule’, and this gives the impression that if you follow a particular pattern you will not go wrong.”

Courts may be called upon to interpret a statute due to disputes over the meaning of a word or phrase contained within a statute. These disputes may arise through a variety of reasons. It has long been held that words are an imperfect means of communication. Omissions may have occurred at the drafting stage, word or phraseology ambiguity, etymological change through time, oversight on specific points, or a failure to adapt legislation to new developments. This may result in the judiciary providing a role in statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation in its broadest sense is the process of determining the true meaning of a written document. The Interpretation Act 1978 provides limited scope to assist judges with statutory interpretation in that it only provides standard definitions to common provisions such as a rebuttable presumption that terminology in the masculine gender also include the feminine, and that the singular includes plural.

There are three main rules to interpret a statute; the literal, golden and mischief rule and also the integrated approach, known as the purposive approach. Each rule will be looked at individually with case examples.

The literal rule uses the plain ordinary meaning of words. In Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731 the defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a price ticket, and was prosecuted for “offering for sale” an offensive weapon contrary to the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The High Court said the phrase “offer for sale” was to be taken literally, in accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the shopkeeper’s display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was presumed that Parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language thus common law expression was not altered.

The golden rule is an extension of the literal rule and has both a narrow and wider application and is used where the literal rule creates an absurdity. This is evident in the narrow sense in Adler v George [1964] All ER 628. Adler gained access to a RAF station and obstructed a member of Her Majesty’s forces engaged in security duties ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place’ He argued that, as he was actually in the prohibited place, he could not be said to be “in the vicinity” of the prohibited place. The literal interpretation of the Official Secrets Act 1920 would allow protesters to demonstrate within military bases but not outside them, creating an absurdity. This was clearly not the intention of this Act. Adler was found guilty of the offence because “in the vicinity of” should be interpreted to mean on or near the prohibited place. In its wider sense, the court may modify the reading of words in order to avoid a repugnant situation as in Re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89. Section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 stated that where a person dies intestate leaving children but no spouse, the estate passes to the children. The defendant had murdered his mother, who did not have a will, and he stood to inherit her estate as next of kin by being her “issue”.  The court applied the golden rule and held that “issue” would not be entitled to inherit where they had killed the deceased.

The mischief rule allows judges slightly more discretion. It looks at the gap or the mischief the statute was intended to cover. In the case of Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102, the Licensing Act 1872 stipulated that it was an offence to be drunk in charge of a carriage. Whilst no direct reference was made to bicycles, the court ruled that Corkery was guilty as the term “carriage” could also be applied to a bicycle.

As per Lord Dennings judgement in Notham v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR 220, the purposive approach is one that will “promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provisions”. The purposive approach is used by the majority of European countries when interpreting their own legislation and also by the European Court of Justice in interpreting European Union law and is becoming increasingly influential. In Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997) IRLR 168 CA, the complainant suffered racial abuse at work, which he claimed amounted to racial discrimination for which the employers were liable under s32 of the Race Relations Act 1976.  The Court of Appeal applied the purposive approach and held that the acts of discrimination were committed “in the course of employment” is to be given an everyday, rather than a tort law, meaning. Any other interpretation ran counter to the whole legislative scheme and underlying policy of s32.

In addition, the courts may also apply rules of language, intrinsic and extrinsic aids and presumptions to aid statutory interpretation. There are three main rules of language. These are ejusdem generis meaning of the same kind, Noscitur a sociis meaning a word is known by the company it keeps, and expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the express mention of one thing excludes others. Intrinsic aids are taken from the Act itself and may include the long or short title of the Act, the preamble, headings, side notes and contextual punctuation. Extrinsic aids consists of previous case law, international conventions, regulations and directives, dictionaries, official reports and most recently in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 583, Hansard. Presumptions within law are numerous and may range from presumption against alterations of the common law to a presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, to name but a few.

In summary, the view that is expressed by James Holland and Julian Webb in Learning Legal Rules (Seventh edition) appears to be simplistic and literal in its context. The rules of statutory interpretation are not rules in the strict sense, as each one may point to different solution to the same problem. There is no hierarchy of rules to be applied and neither is any court bound to follow a particular rule. They are purely guidelines for the judiciary to solve problems with statutory interpretation.

Bibliography

Acts of Parliament:

Interpretation Act 1978

Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959

Official Secrets Act 1920

Licensing Act 1872

Administration of Estates Act 1925

Case Law:

Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731

Adler v George [1964] All ER 628

Corkery v Carpenter [1951] 1 KB 102

Re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89

Notham v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR 220

Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd (1997) IRLR 168 CA

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 583

References:

W200 Understanding Law, Manual 1 (2011), Third Edition, The College of Law, SUP021173

The English Legal System, Eleventh Edition 2010-2011, Gary Slapper, David Kelly, ISBN 978-0-415-56695-7

Learning Legal Rules (Seventh edition), James Holland and Julian Webb, ISBN 978-0-19-955774-5