Effect of Race and Gender Bias on Jury Decisions

Abstract

Juries decide less than 1% of all criminal cases in England and Wales. Defendants in these cases are charged with the most serious criminal offences and face imprisonment for many years. The fairness of jury decision-making is therefore of fundamental importance to the criminal justice system. Prejudices do exist within everyday life and therefore why would 12 ordinary lay persons be any less prejudiced? Race and gender would appear to be two of the biggest prejudice at play within society. The case of R v Mirza first showcased some of the issues that arise through racial bias in a jury trial. The published work of Cheryl Thomas and Rosemary Pattenden, also confirms the inequalities faced within a jury trial. The right to fair trial in a fundamental right granted by Article 6 ECHR. Therefore, everything should be done to comply with this principle.

This lack of knowledge about jury decision-making is usually incorrectly attributed to section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. This makes it a criminal offence to give any information about the statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced, or votes cast by members of a jury during their deliberations. Thus, making it impossible to determine the actual rationale behind a jury’s decision.

At last, a member of the jury can be coordinated regarding how carry on as per the rules, yet to totally keep their inclinations from affecting a choice might be unmanageable. Without discarding juries, it appears to be difficult to lead a fair trial, however what options could offer a reasonable and suitable solution are difficult to determine.

Chapter One: The Role of Juries and Access to a Fair Trial

Introduction

The issue of racial and gender bias in juries is a very contentious issue, it is raised due to a perceived lack of fairness in a jury trial. The notion of trials by jury has developed substantial over the years. In 1215, following the Norman Conquest, The Magna Carta included recognition that a person has the right to be trialled by ‘the lawful judgment of his peers’.[1] Despite much of the criticism of the ability of jurors to fulfil their role, they still maintain ‘considerable public confidence’.[2] This section will initially examine the capacity of the jury, and the legal framework set up to allow a reasonable trial. It will then further address the rights of members of the jury. Besides, it will discuss whether these controls are effective in coordinating members of the jury with the goal that they are impartial and objective. The section will conclude, questioning the effectiveness of the current system and assess the possible need for reform.

The Function of the Jury

Under the Juries Act 1974,[3] every person aged between 18 years and 70 years and whose name is on the electoral register qualifies for jury service. A jury consists of twelve people chosen at random from all ages, genders and backgrounds. The role of the jury is to make a judgment from the evidence presented in court. Thus they decide whether a person is guilty or innocent.[4] Trial by jury is  a product of ancient feudal law, designed to minimise the influence of corruptible judges by the establishment of an independent fact finding forum.[5] As a result of using peers as the individuals, it strengthens people belief in certainty, by giving them a voice on vital matters in court, while lessening the authority of judges.[6] It was initially invoked to protect men from the king’s persecution and continues to act as a safeguard against a possible corruptible officials,[7] The jury system was intended to create a fairer justice system rather than having to solely rely on a judge to be judge jury and executioner. Allowing citizens involvement within the law thus Increasing the fairness in a trial.[8] The reason for a jury is clear, however in modern day society it is arguable that this medieval system is still fulfilling its intended purpose.

The Right to a Fair Trial

This chapter will look at the required obligations for a fair trial under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) Article 6.[9] Simultaneously, the chapter will consider whether a jury can comply with these provisions. It is important to note that it is extremely difficult for a jury trial to satisfy fairness under Article 6, Piersack v Belgium,[10] demonstrates the need for an absence of preference, concerning the judge and juries. The chapter will deduct that through governmental restrictions for the jury system, accompanied with a supportive public backing, the jury is successfully assisted in achieving the fair trial requirements under Article 6. The safeguards that are currently in place can be questioned as to whether they protect the right to fair trial. There is a clear misconception that juries act in a way that supports a fair trial. Finally the juries pre-conceived biases that affect their decision making will be questioned and analysed.

Article 6 requirements

Articles 6 of the ECHR require trial before an “impartial tribunal” “without discrimination because of “race, language, religion … national or social origin”.[11] According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), means that there must be subjective as well as objective independence and impartiality;[12] to satisfy the legal requirements of Article 6 the judge or jury must be acting free from bias in accordance with Article 6, When the issue of racial bias is raised before verdict, compliance with article 6 depends on the content of the allegation and the way the domestic courts react to it. If they do not respond, we know from Remli v. France[13] and R v Gough[14] that article 6 is violated. An allegation must be investigated[15] and, if it is found to be plausible, something effective must be done about it.[16] 

It is firstly necessary to consider whether juries satisfy the requirement of providing an independent and impartial tribunal. For the jury to be both independent and impartial it is anticipated that the jury would only consider the evidence they are presented with in court and no other factors. Under section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981,[17] jury’s deliberations cannot be revealed. Therefore, it is questionable that if the public were aware of jurors’ discussions or if the court were to consider what may have taken place during these, whether the public would be confident in the jury system providing fair trials. How can the public be certain that these deliberations are independent and impartial? It is important that jurors are free from bias. In Holm v Sweden,[18] five of the jurors in the case were members of the political party that was the subject of the defamatory material. The court found that the fears of bias could be ‘objectively justified’. This emphasises how jurors must be free from bias, as public confidence is key in their success. Puller v UK[19] showcased the importance of impartiality, no member should hold any preference. To avoid potential breakdowns of justice and to give complete effect to the concept of impartiality under Article 6, some means need to be found whereby the Court of Appeal can investigate potential bias in the jury room.[20] R v M[21] distinguished bias juror as somebody with preconception that could make them unequipped for achieving a genuine decision.

Accountability is problematic in jury trials owed to jurors not being required to give reasons for their verdict. So there is never a definitive reason identified for the jury’s decision to either convict or not unlike a judge there is no way to identify the ratio decidendi.[22] Some see the lack of accountability as an irrational feature of the jury system.[23] Jackson notes the increasing demand for the justice system to be more accountable to the public.[24] A case that argues with this theory is Taxquet v Belgium the ECtHR ruled that Article 6 can still be satisfied in a trial by a jury that does not give reasons for its verdict, but the public and the defendant must be able to understand the jury’s verdict and there must be sufficient safeguards in place to prevent arbitrariness.[25]

Problems with Jury secrecy

The jury secrecy rule[26] prohibits the court from receiving evidence from a juror after the verdict has been given about anything said during the jury’s deliberations. The reason for the rule includes: ensuring finality of the verdict, as well as protecting the jury from pressure or inducement to explain or alter their views.[27] The common law was reinforced by the Contempt of Court Act,[28] but it has recently been repealed by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.[29] In R v Mirza it was distinguished that a court could be in contempt of itself. This concept was unwelcomed by some stating it was ‘difficult to grasp’ (per Lord Slynn) and ‘an absurdity’ (per Lord Steyn).[30] Jury secrecy serves to promote open deliberations, protects jurors from reproach by the public or the media. When the suspicion then arises that the jury process in each trial has not been conducted accordingly, it creates a whole debate on whether secrecy is realistic and fair in a legal trial.[31]

The notion that removing the juror privacy laws will adversely affect the idea of an open discussion is based on the idea that jurors are fearful of what the media and public will think of their comments.[32] It is noted by Haralambous that this is only a speculative argument as we do not have any evidence, however it is difficult to contend being in the members of the jury position and having your reasons and thought process speculated at would terrify, alongside the dread of your remarks being repeated to the individual perhaps indicted.[33]

It would not be fair for jury deliberations to be subject to public and media scrutiny, as people would not have read and understood detailed accounts of the whole case and so are likely to draw uninformed and potentially inaccurate conclusions. It must also not be forgotten that this is a public service that jurors are conducting. To allow jurors to be further scrutinised and questioned would lead to an unrealistic and impossible role to be fulfilled. However, this should not mean that jurors are not held up to the highest of expectations. When it comes to determining an individual’s freedom, should we not expect the highest form of competence from jurors. The reason the public’s confidence is so high in jury’s, is that the public perception they work and are without reproach, due to their nature of being fair and unbiased. If this is not the case then then how can public confidence remain.

Connor[34] and Mirza[35] are very important case concerning jury secrecy. Both cases illustrate quite prudently the potential injustices which the secrecy rules can give rise to. Lord Slynn agreed that eliminating jury secrecy would ‘undermine public confidence’.[36] it is generally accepted that jury deliberations should be kept secret, mainly to allow for honesty and openness in the jury room and to protect jurors.[37] However, it is possible that these objectives could be achieved through less strict secrecy guidelines.[38] Under the Human Rights Act 1998 everyone in the UK have the right to a fair trial protected under Article 6 ECHR, the court’s decision in Mirza[39] that it is acceptable to allow several unjust convictions to protect the jury system is alarming on a colossal scale. The judicial system should be striving to create a fair and just legal system not allowing indiscretions to pass for the ‘so called greater good’. This utilitarian view that is outdated and not acceptable in a modern-day era.[40]

Mirza[41] is a very contentious case which was disturbing for some; Haralambous agrees with Lord Steyn’s opinion that declining to enquire in to a juries inconsistencies will lead to injustice regarding Article 6.[42] A key issue with jury secrecy is that there is a realistic possibility of a miscarriage of justice, if only realised after a verdict has been reached then there is nothing the court can do to remedy this.[43] Lord Steyn in his judgment stated that a complete refusal to investigate in to jury deliberations could deprive a defendant of his/ her right to be tried by an impartial tribunal and jury trial should not be an exception as ‘a jury is not above the law’.[44]

Achieving fairness in jury trials

Nonetheless, ‘trust in the jury is secured by the procedural framework in place to try assure a fair trial in conjunction with Article 6. Standards of adjudication are both generally familiar and widely accepted’.[45] The standards of adjudication include the basic standards of due process, which are given more explicit recognition through Article 6.[46] “Judicial rhetoric holds that jurors, should be as white as paper”[47] It also states that juries are to approach ‘without any preconceived ideas and by reference to the evidence alone.’[48] However this is not what happens. In the jury box, as outside it, the juror’s decision-making is influenced by his moral values, personal experiences, personality, beliefs, predispositions and prejudices.[49] However, to try and prevent juror misconduct the courts of England and Wales have the jurisdiction at common law to punish jurors who act in Contempt of Court Act 1981.[50] The oath that jurors take is effectively a promise that they will not commit any form of contempt of court. This seeks to further identify the seriousness of the role of a juror and deter jurors from acting in contempt of court.

With the creation of the Contempt of Court Act, the law enacted being able to protect the integrity of the trial. However, the jury is not the sole focus of the act, it covers a range of conduct, which could undermine the course of justice. Section 1 identifies the strict liability rule, interference with the course of justice will amount to contempt, focusing on publications, which have the potential to create the risk of prejudice.[51] In AG v Times Newspapers Ltd[52] it was determined that any bias must be considered contempt. The jury is supposed to enter the courtroom with a blank mind and determine their decision from the facts of the case and nothing more. Sadly, the pre-conceived prejudices are almost impossible to determine. Leading to little in the way of justice and a fair trial.

The importance of public confidence

The procedural framework must be sufficient and effective to ensure public confidence within the judicial system. If not it threatens to violate Article 6. The public must believe that the jury does not have any preconceived misconceptions based on any physical characteristics. Juries have considerable value in enhancing public confidence in the fairness of the criminal process, particularly through the perception of impartiality.[53] The public must have confidence that the safeguards are enough to ensure impartiality. Since jurors have the protection of jury secrecy the reasons and actions they take we cannot know for sure whether the procedural safeguards are working or not.

Trial by jury still retains considerable public confidence through its perceived fairness.[54] The first of these core values, representativeness, resides in the ability made available for ordinary citizens to play an important participatory role in the criminal process. ‘Citizens still view the jury as having a greater political and social functions that go beyond the efficient determination of guilt and innocence.’[55] As Marder notes, ‘Countries, that aspire to being more democratic, seek to try emulate our criminal justice system’.[56] The jury trial allows for the public to be given a voice and to be the crux of the most serious criminal cases in the country. Arguments remain about jury composition.[57] Research was conducted by Roberts and Hough, which evidenced strong support for jury trials.[58] A Bar Council survey in England and Wales found that 85% stated they ‘trust juries to come to the right decision’; 82% believed they had a greater chance of a fair trial if they were tried by a jury than a judge alone; and 68% agreed that they ‘would have less confidence in a justice system that reduced the number of cases tried by juries by two-thirds’.[59] This research demonstrates the level of public confidence in juries, it then creates a huge argument to support juries and gives less yield for possible reforms.

Conclusion

In conclusion, for jury deliberations to be made public or to force the jury to give reasons for them would dramatically alter the role of a juror. This could also lead to lower public confidence, which as previously stated is significant. Instead, as the ECtHR recognised, confidential jury deliberations without reasons to justify the verdict can be compatible with Article 6 if there is a procedural framework in place that provides sufficient guarantees as to, inter alia, the jury’s impartiality.[60] The nature of juries means that privacy is required to ensure that deliberations can be candor, and the decision final. Article 6 guarantees the right to a fair trial as a fundamental human right. So even if one case was determined unfair due to a juror’s bias, based on and physical characteristics of which there has been numerous cases, it would be unconstitutional and shake public confidence. It reignites the greater good argument raised by the utilitarianism theorist such as Bentham.[61] Does the benefit of the many outweigh that of the few? There have been many proposed reforms for the jury service, however removing jury secrecy has never been taking seriously. In no small part, due to the problems that this could cause may destroy public confidence in the jury system, which is what makes the system so worthy of protection.

Juries are a vital element of our legal system, based on the premise that twelve minds are better than one.[62] Although public’s certainty is of key significance, it is essential for Article 6 to be maintained for trust to remain. Because of the current procedural structure attempting to fuse decency into our legal framework alongside the key element of unprejudiced nature. The safeguards in place are sufficient and if adhered to, then the significance of the jury will continued.[63] Regarding the law around contempt of court, it is imperative that clear that amendments are initiated to further its authority and make it more relevant and fearful. It has been argued that it is naïve to expect jurors to put aside their biases when they deliberate on a trial.[64] This does not, question the impartiality of the jury as the collective nature of the deliberations are thought to balance out individual prejudices.[65] Although it is generally accepted that jurors will bring their own prejudices to the deliberations, Mirza[66] illustrates that some biases are more acceptable than others. The prevalence and impact of such prejudices upon jury deliberations are presently unknown and it is hoped that if the jury secrecy rules are relaxed, it will not be a case of “injustice not only being done, but also being seen to be done.”[67] It has been argued, that if jury deliberations can be investigated further, there is no reason why convictions and acquittals should not both be subject to review.[68]

Chapter Two: The Current Problems Facing Trial by Jury

Introduction

This chapter will seek to demonstrate the current research that has been conducted with regards to juries’ decision making and whether certain physical characteristics influence juries’ decision making. The chapter will be split into two further sections, the effect of race on a jury trial, secondly that of gender influence on a jury trial. The chapter will seek to further investigate and criticise the research that has been conducted regarding both gender and race, it shall then investigate to demonstrate what can be done to expand these findings and critically analyse how they could be improved. This shall then lead to a determination of whether the jury service needs reform, to create a fairer and just system.

Much of the research encountered, encompasses the use of mock jury trials. A major report by Professor Cheryl Thomas of UCL, published by the Ministry of Justice in February 2010.[69] Professor Thomas reports on an extensive empirical research project designed to explore the fairness of jury decision-making. It is the largest study of its kind ever carried out in this country. The research used a “multi-method” approach to examine several specific questions about both the outcomes and the process of jury decision-making. The methods were a case simulation with real juries (68 juries involving nearly 800 jurors) at Crown Courts, a large-scale analysis of all jury verdicts (over 68,000 verdicts) in England and Wales for an 18-month period in 2006-2008, and a post-verdict survey of 668 jurors in 62 cases investigating juries’ inconsistences.[70]

The case re-enactment considered introduced an indistinguishable trial in which just the race of the respondent was changed, this demonstrated all-white juries don’t oppress minority ethnic (BME) litigants. They were not sentenced any more frequently than the white litigant. Be that as it may, juries had considerably more trouble achieving a decision when the case included a BME litigant or casualty contrasted with when the case just included White members.[71] Similarly, the large-scale analysis of actual jury verdicts showed only a marginal difference in conviction rates depending on the race of the defendant (63 per cent for White and Asian defendants, 67 per cent for Black defendants). Given the disproportionate representation of BME groups elsewhere in the criminal justice process (stop and search, arrest, charge, prison), a conclusion that they are not disproportionately convicted by juries is highly significant. It would be intriguing to check whether these findings were repeated by a tantamount research extend in the officers’ courts. Unquestionably, as the report takes note of, the discoveries knock down a great part of the contention for racially adjusted juries to guarantee fairness in criminal trials.

Overall, juries convict on 64 per cent of all charges.[72] The report suggests that variations are related to the likelihood of strong direct evidence of guilt being available thus offences of making indecent photographs of a child, drug possession with intent to supply, and causing death by dangerous driving have the highest conviction rates and, at the lower end of the range, to the difficulty of proving culpable states of mind, thus offences of threatening to kill and attempted murder have the lowest conviction rates. This raises critical questions over the utilization of juries, as though they can’t apparently comprehend the complex cases do they truly fulfil their purpose. One intriguing and critical finding is that juries convict in assault cases more regularly than they vindicate. A conviction rate of 55% for assault, is higher than for attempted murder, homicide and bringing on grievous body harm. This is not to deny that the general attrition rate in cases involving rape is high, however the report recommends that it can’t be attributed to failure of juries to convict or to jury bias against female complainants.[73]

The role of a jury, is to understand and follow the trial judge’s direction and consider only the facts and evidence, to determine whether the respondent is blameworthy of the offense charged. The jury are bound by the judge’s heading on the law, yet may make feelings on the actualities anyway they see fit. The trial judge coordinates the jury not to estimate: they should just consider the confirmation which has been displayed to them and ought not go to any choices considering guess.[74] The jury are likewise advised not to address anyone outside of the jury about the trial, as they ought not be affected by the suppositions of other individuals who were absent all through the trial and have not heard the information and evidence presented. The jury ought to achieve a decision considering, just the confirmation before them. These briefings serve to guarantee that the jury are not affected by outer components. In any case, case law exhibits that outer impacts may have an influence in thoughts where these bearings are not upheld by the jury. In R v Qureshi, [75] a juror came forward after the trial and reported that other jurors had made racist comments during deliberations, fallen asleep during the trial and adopted a ‘bullying attitude’ in the jury room. In Attorney-General v Scotcher, [76] a juror came forward after a trial and expressed his concerns that other jurors had been prejudiced against the defendants and ‘changed their vote late on simply because they wanted to get out of the courtroom and go home’.[77] These examples demonstrate the lack of impartiality and competence expected of jury members. If the system in place does not fulfil its intentions then clear address to reforms are apparent.

Research; effect of race in a jury trial

In the 2011 census, twelve per cent of the population of England and Wales were not classified as white.[78] Racial strains evidently exist and it is likely that among the people haphazardly chose from the electoral roll to fill in as members of the jury there will be some with race-related biases.[79]By this slant to prejudge others utilizing pejorative generalizations in view of impression of “race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin”.[80].

The impact of race on juries is unpredictable and hard to discover because of a huge absence of such research inside this region. The Contempt of Court Act 1981, segment 8(1) avoids coordinate examination of jury consultations[81] and no research on jury-race issues using simulated juries is available in this country.[82] The only reliable information is a report published in 2003 by Hood, Shute and Seemungal,[83] on ethnic minority perceptions of the criminal courts. Approximately 778 ethnic minority respondents were met. Only 33% of the individuals who were tried in Court, griped about out of line treatment and a number related this to their ethnicity: in the case of black litigants it was one in five and Asians were one in eight.[84] Six of the thirty black defendants (20%) thought that the jury was unsympathetic to, or racially biased against them.[85] A further four, whose fundamental concern was racially biased sentencing, additionally griped about jury preference. Comparable grievances were made by two of the eleven Asians tried by juries. A white usher with many years’ experience told the analysts that ‘jury individuals in some cases simply need to see ethnic minority litigants go down: they’re biased.’[86]

A defendant may encounter racial bias due to a jury which acts beyond its scope.[87] There are very few reported cases sadly. Possibly due to jurors fear of coming forward and reporting racial discrimination, this will be looked at in more detail later. A reported allegation of jury racial bias was noted in R. v. Bowyer [88] in which a jury acquitted two white Leeds United football players of assault on an Asian man. The evidence was significant against the footballers but the jury choose to acquit them, whether this was purely based on the fact the victim was Asian is unknown, but it is certainly debateable.

Judicial rhetoric holds that jurors “should be as white as paper”[89] and that juries are to approach their task ‘without any preconceived ideas and by reference to the evidence alone.’[90] However, this is not what actually happens.[91] The juror’s decision-making is influenced by their own experiences, moral values, personality, religion, predispositions and prejudices.[92] This is one of the advantages of members of the jury, they convey the vast majority of these viewpoints to a jury box however as it demonstrates these biased ideas is the issue that makes them discriminatory. The Court of Appeal perceives that a member of the jury may draw motivation from his past.[93] The courts does not want jurors to take extra-evidential factors into account that are a likely to cause a bias decision, although this ask is a seemingly impossible task.[94] To dismiss self-defence because those with dark skins are believed to be inclined to aggression[95]is unacceptable. Sadly, other common stereotypes include: “black people look much the same,”[96] and “do not respect the law”[97]. “Muslims are terrorists;”[98] “Jews are greedy;”[99]. Even if these are not conscious stereotypes they can also manifest subconsciously which creates the same outcome through a bias unfair perspective. Although this theory then creates an impossible task to create an unbiased view for a juror. The Mirza[100] jury was accused of being racist after determining that a man, who was an immigrant from Pakistan, who had been settled in England since 1988 was using an interpreter as “a devious ploy to help his case”.[101] This interpretation is not unusual.[102] An Indian solicitor with 14 years’ experience complained to Hood,[103] a defendant who appears in court in England and cannot speak English as his first language, who then requires an interpreter. The perception is that the person is hiding behind there interpreter.’[104] This is not necessarily the case, but proves the theory that racial prejudices do exist and are noticeable and quantifiable.[105] In the UK, the public perception is that we currently trust juries: lawyers,[106]judges[107] and opinion polls[108]agree on this. There is evidence that ethnic minorities do: given the choice, black defendants opt for trial by jury.[109] The public’s perception though is a fragile thing and could easily be swayed if the law does not create an effective system for dealing with such injustices and racial biases.

Concerns over whether juries are representative or not have been raised in relation to gender, age and employment in the past, but in recent years the concern has focused particularly on ethnicity.[110] For decades, it has been stated that ethnic minority groups are underrepresented on juries.[111] However, no substantive research has been led in this country on these issues for the last 20 years, and the examination beforehand will have next to zero use in this day and age as circumstances are different and minorities numbers have developed.[112] The Contempt of Court Act limitations on discussing considerations with jurors can’t be specifically responsible for this absence of research, as it would not make a difference to analysing jury representation.[113]

The catchment area for summoning jurors for each Crown Court is the first important factor; a substantial proportion of ethnic minorities can only be summoned for jury service for a court if there is a substantial proportion of ethnic minorities living in the court’s catchment area.[114] Regardless of the possibility that there are numerous ethnic minorities in the catchment territory. The following issue is whether they are selected on the discretionary rundown to have the capacity to be rung for jury obligation. It has been asserted that ethnic minorities include one of the biggest classes of people who might be meet all requirements to serve on juries however are not summoned because they are not enlisted as voters. A Home Office report in 1999[115] claimed that 24% of the Black community, 15% of those from the Indian sub-continent, and 24% of other ethnic minorities are not registered to vote.[116] However this outcome depended on a review that did not recognize ethnic minorities who are fit the bill to vote and the individuals who are most certainly not. Among the jury pool, issues regarding whether the development of a jury panel for individual cases and the way toward choosing the 12 jurors from the panel in any capacity unfavourably influences ethnic minority representation on juries.[117]

There have only ever been two credible studies as to ethnic representation on the jury system in the last 30 years in England and Wales. The first of which was conducted in the 1970s by Baldwin and McConville, where they examined ethnic representation on juries in Birmingham Crown Court.[118] The review revealed a huge under-portrayal of ethnic minorities on juries at Birmingham Crown Court. This was contrasted with the quantity of ethnic minorities resided within the area. Be that as it may, this review was around three decades ago, and its degree was fundamentally restricted to just a single Crown Court.

The second study was conducted in 1992, by Zander. It was a survey of all jurors serving in most Crown Courts in the England and wales during a two-week period in February 1992, (the Crown Court Study).[119] It detailed some under-portrayal of certain ethnic groups inside specific ranges and purviews of the nation. Comparatively, it additionally discovered some over-portrayal of other ethnic groups serving on juries. Tragically, official limitations forced on the review implied that it was not able relate ethnic minority portrayal on juries to ethnic minority populaces in each Crown Court area.[120] The report was somewhat traded off by the limitations put on it, the data is not however pointless it grants a slight knowledge into the under portrayal of ethnic minorities on juries. However, another report ought to be created in a comparative style to this one, with less restrictions and concentrate on territories exclusively as opposed to the correlations that were utilized on the inclination of the national normal.

At the start of the 21^st century, three cities courts were selected for the Auld Review, where juries would be observed. Liverpool, Nottingham and Durham were selected for the review. The observers reported a “noticeable lack of ethnic mix in jury trials”, yet as Lord Justice Auld himself acknowledged, “these observations were both limited and unscientific.”[121] It becomes difficult to make any genuine assurance from a report that was condemned by its own author, however it seems strange that the same pattern constantly emerges that ethnic minorities are under-represented. The reports all appear to be questionable and unreliable. The administration has not dispatched a report that has yet” held its own water”, as each report so far has in somehow being undermined.

Since the Auld Review, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration (HMICA) carried out an inspection at 20 Crown Court centre’s in England and Wales.[122] Where it was reported that all-White juries or jury pools “in some areas where the ethnic mix of the local area would be expected to produce a greater representation of minority groups”.[123] The report listed the 20 courts reviewed, yet it did not state which of the 20 courts assessed it was alluding to. Unmistakably the report expected to locate a more noteworthy BME portrayal on juries in specific territories. Once more the report led has turned out to be unreliable and practically cryptic because of an unforeseen outcome, and it is along these lines unrealistic to survey whether these were legitimate expectations.

The Birmingham and Crown Court studies, analysed the representative nature of the individuals who were serving on juries. The reports were not appointed or intended to look at the effect of the summoning and selection procedure of a jury. Changes to the jury selection process since these reports were appointed have modified the path in which we select attendants and how they are summoned, this will clearly affect influence on ethnic representation. These progressions include: the foundation of the Jury Central Summoning Bureau 2001 which institutionalized the whole jury summoning process; the presentation of automated random selection of all legal hearers in 2001; the 2001 national census uncovering changes in ethnic populace socioeconomics in England and Wales; and the presentation of new attendant qualification necessities which became effective in 2004.[124] In this period, there have likewise been legitimate difficulties to the absence of ethnic blend on juries, and proposals to government to change both the summoning procedure and the empanelling of juries to accomplish more prominent ethnic representation.[125]

In addition, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998[126] introduced a new class of racially-aggravated offences,[127] which gave spark to an increase in the prosecution of racially motivated crimes. These extra sorts of arraignments brought up new issues about jury’s and jury determination. Should ethnic minorities be represented on juries, not just where the litigant is from an ethnic minority background additionally where the victim is from an ethnic minority gathering. Notwithstanding considering these new advancements, no present day important research has been led to “formally” decide if ethnic minorities are underrepresented.[128]

The country with the most research on race and jury representation, is the United States of America.[129] The greater part of the 50 states have made an exclusive race and ethnic reasonableness commissions since the 1990s to remunerate the issue of racial portrayal inside the jury.[130] A comparable framework to that of England and Wales with the discretionary part, the US utilize the voter enrolment source records utilized for member of the jury summoning. In any case, it is doubtful that the utilization of vehicle permitting records and phone indexes to envelop more ethnic minorities, would make a considerably more prominent various jury.[131] Research conducted in the US, on the jury choice process, delivered comes about that were not surprising. The discoveries demonstrate that they oppress ethnic minorities. A review in California found that social class applied more noteworthy impact than race in clarifying disproportionate jury representation. Ethnic minority jurors with low salaries and less prestigious occupations were under-represented, however African Americans and Hispanics with higher livelihoods and high notoriety employments were over-represented on juries.[132]

The US experience and research is a good source in relation to methodologies used to examine this issue, however it must be analysed with respect that it is an entirely different country with different customs and laws. This means that we cannot draw to many conclusions from their findings.[133] There are vast differences between our jury system and culture and Americas, although they create a good model that we have tried to imitate the results they have are not our own. Ethnic numbers and minorities are significantly different and possibly the American experience is dominated by memories of unfair jury selection procedures that systematically excluded African Americans from jury service in state courts.[134] The UK have not had the past experiences and issues such as this. A major difference between our jury systems is the jury selection process the US has. The use of peremptory challenges (either party’s right to reject a limited number of prospective jurors without providing cause) is not currently part of the England and Wales Jury selection process.[135] However an argument to bring this selection process comes with little positive backing. The process allows for jurors to be judged and asked to stand down, based mostly on appearance and some questions designed to seek bias. Although this sounds positive it allows for juries to be manipulated into a stronger stance based on ethnicity, also there is no reason needed for the jurors to be asked to stand down there is no accountability. With ethnic minority, already being underrepresented on juries in England and Wales, it becomes even easier to compile a jury that would either be favourable to a defendant or bias.[136]

Research; genders effect on a jury.

It is generally agreed by legal researchers that the determining factor in deciding a case is the evidence provided.[137] Everything else is debateable regarding whether it makes a distinction in determining guilt or not. These worries whether sex impacts the basic decision making process are women more inclined to be harsher on men, will men prone to be more unerstanding to other men. The impact of gender on jury decision making is complex, connected to different factors in the trial.

A study by Chris L. Kleinke and Cecilia Meyer University of Alaska, Anchorage.[138] The Study found that Men with high confidence in a just world, would assess a recorded rape victim more adversely than men with low faith in a just world. Women with high faith in a just world were less negative toward the rape victim than women with low confidence in a just world. The review created comes about expressing that members with low faith in a just world would suggest essentially longer jail sentences for the attacker. A huge finding was the way that men appointed fundamentally greater duty to the rape victim for the assault than women. Women, interestingly doled out altogether greater obligation to the attacker for the assault than men.[139] This shows that men and women clearly think differently and generally seem to side with their own gender over all else.

The Crown Court Study[140] which was beforehand specified, had the government express concern that women were under-represented among serving legal hearers, yet no proof of this was found in the summoning overview. Among each one of those summoned who did jury service in all the Crown Courts consolidated, the extent of ladies to men was the same (51% to 49% separately). What’s more, individual juries amid the review, there were no all-male or all-female juries or even any juries with just a single male or one female member of the jury; 88% of the considerable number of juries had either a 6:6, 7:5 or 8:4 sex split.[141] These results simply strengthen the conclusion that neither men or women are underrepresented in jury’s. Although it does not satisfy the strict tests that were set out previously due to the small area these observations were conducted within. Reading and Manchester scarcely represent to the whole England and Wales jury framework. It was additionally already contended that the crown court study was confined by authority limitations and condemned for only this as practically pointless report by Cheryl Thomas, so in what capacity can the report be considered commendable then in view of various realities if the report was lacking in deciding ethnic separation then how might it be confided in men and women representation.[142]

The Influence of Gender and Age in Mock Juror Decision-Making by Annik Mossière and J. Thomas Dalby.[143]This study examines the influence of demographic and physical characteristics on mock juror decision-making. The gender of a fictitious criminal defendant who was labelled a psychopath was manipulated to examine the potential prejudicial impact on mock juror’s decision-making.[144] An aggregate of 239 members (119 males and 120 females) drawn from a university and a group test were utilized as a part of this review. Equal quantities of males and females were categorised in three age groups: 18-25 years, 30-45 years, or 46-60 years were utilized to identify the source of predisposition. The members read an invented murder situation, trailed by a therapist’s master declaration. Members were solicited to choose with respect to the blame from the litigant, and if appropriate, indicate the sentence the blameworthy respondent ought to receive. Discoveries from past research specifically at sexual orientation inclination were not duplicated. However, results demonstrated a huge cooperation between hearer age and decision/sentencing type. The most youthful age aggregate suggested a blameworthy decision and a sentence of probation more regularly than the more seasoned age gatherings. Interestingly, the more seasoned age gatherings were more probable than the most youthful age gathering to give a decision of not liable, and sentence of imprisonment (when a blameworthy decision was given). These outcomes raise concerns with respect to perspectives of the equity framework when an assignment of psychopathy is included, and in addition contrasts in intellectual preparing that happen crosswise over ages.[145]

Although this review did not discover critical sex impacts, the frequencies of judgments take after patterns like that of past research: Male respondents were discovered blameworthy marginally more regularly and given harsher sentences than female litigants. Also, female members of the jury were to some degree more inclined to give blameworthy decisions than male legal hearers. This proof even though may not be the most grounded it makes an intriguing verbal confrontation that men might be treated with marginally more inclination because of their gender alone. Contrastingly ladies are apparently treated with more mercy only because of their gender. An unmistakable display of unfair and unjust penalization based on gender.

An eminent inquiry with this mock trial exists in the practice, of which as opposed to real jury procedures, the taunt members of the jury did not have the chance to consider among themselves. What the impact of permitting the attendants to go about as they would under ordinary legal hearer conditions would make a fascinating read. Would the choices and the rate of liable decisions be adjusted in view of convalescing with different legal hearers. “ForsterLee and colleagues (2006)[146] suggest that groups are more sensitive to biasing information than individuals, providing support for examination of this issue in future studies. The idea of using a group mock-design would allow researchers to discuss complex issues and to get extended feedback.”[147] The suppositions of others can be very useful in the manner of gaining feedback as to a decision. This potential research could give qualitative data recognizing why mock legal hearers decided to either convict or not.[148] Difficulties with group mock-trials occur in the sample and in the recruitment process.[149] But the research would generate an iconic debate as to what influences a juror’s decision.

Conclusion

Through the examination conducted it remains hard to distinguish if there is jury predisposition due the absence of value research. However enough research has been conducted to confirm that there are issues within the current jury framework. Ethnic minorities are underrepresented this makes predisposition on assessments and feelings. Additionally, there may not be a greater part in either sex being over-spoken to, however the realities demonstrate that men and ladies do have a predisposition against the inverse sex. Alongside this it shows they have more compassion for their own particular sexual orientation. The question initially was, Are Juries Fair: Do Race & Gender Bias Generate Unfair Decisions? This has been demonstrated, even though the evidence may not be empirical and further investigations should be conducted. The information used so far has stated there is bias in jury’s, which conflicts with Article 6 ECHR. The American jury system introduces some interesting possibilities, as they seem to have less issues with minorities being less represented. However, the research discussed was hard to translate to the England and wales jury system as the cultures and demographics are vastly different. The outcome of this research should be that firstly, the England and Wales system needs more investigation into jury bias through race and gender. The second is that something should be done to combat the issues we currently face. The presumption from the current research is that predisposition does exist and it seems difficult to refute, with this supposition assurance should be set up to secure the right to a fair trial.

Chapter Three – Concepts for Reform

Introduction

The procedural structure and the law on hatred are set up to guarantee that people have admittance to viable, impartial courts, to keep up the general population’s trust in the lawful framework. [150] Research has demonstrated that the jury framework is at present not satisfying Article 6 necessities in all trials. It has been noticed that there have been moderately few instances of legal hearer wrongdoing reported in England and Wales, so externally it does not have all the earmarks of challenging the subjective unbiasedness guideline of a fair trial. Be that as it may, the issue is floating further into the publics mind-set,[151] which is risky for the target fairness of the jury framework, as though general society does not assume that juries are fair-minded then this necessity can’t be met. While offense may appear to be difficult to control, this section will concentrate on the routes in which it can be diminished, with extra direction and options to jury framework. initially, the proposals from the Law Commission will be examined alongside; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and Juries Act 1974; Criminal Offense; Judicial Direction; Jury Deliberations; Jury participation; Restricting jurors’ access to information and lastly Abolishment of the Jury. Assessing these theories as far as the degree to which they are probably going to determine the issues in this area. This section will address whatever other potential arrangements, in the endeavour to battle the issue of legal hearers utilizing a person’s physical attributes as a predisposition in conveying a decision.

The Law Commission

In 2012, the law on contempt turned into the subject of Parliamentary level headed discussion bringing about the Law Commission distributing a counsel paper because of the Attorney-General’s call for earnest audit.[152] After recognizing the issues, the Commission’s discussion paper was passed, with a report being distributed in 2013 setting out recommendations for change, consolidating the conclusions from the consultation paper. The goal of change incorporated the change of clearness and consistency inside the law, as the extent of contempt can differ between courts[153] what’s more, jurisdictions bringing about false impressions and wrongdoings. Their point was to react to issues to guarantee open trust in the framework is kept up and making the law clear, reasonable, current and practicable.[154]

They tried to secure and limit the danger of members of the jury acting on prejudice, by making it clear what is precluded and the potential repercussions that could take after on the off chance that they overlook the directions.[155] They proposed a few measures before empanelling the jury, to enhance their comprehension of their part, including more prominent training and more comprehensive information about their part, along with what is disallowed[156] to modifying the wording of the pledge to construct the decision in light of just the proof heard in court; obligates members of the jury to sign a composed revelation; educate attendants about making inquiries amid the trial; build up a framework for legal hearers to report concerns.[157] These proposals set forward by the Commission are a stage in the correct course to cut down on wrongdoing, with this part finishing up the best arrangements being instruction and further direction. Be that as it may, this does not appear to address the reasonable reality that predisposition choices and activities are obvious. The changes appear to construct their enhancements considering the predication that hearers will be more taught and have better comprehension in their part. It can be contended that understanding the part and its significance is not the issue, by making further principles and disciplines to tail it, becomes questionable that this will battle jury bias. Long standing prejudice cannot be easily fixed and without providing reason as to their decision.

The Commission’s aim is to keep up open trust in the framework,[158] trials should be held on the evidence introduced in court with no other thought to be considered,[159] to maintain trust in the jury framework.

Criminal Offence

In R v Mirza[160] and Taxquet v Belgium, they demonstrate diverse courses in which the jury’s consultations can influence a trial and why advance safeguards should be taken to avert it, by giving lucidity and consistency in the law.[161] In their discussion paper, they highlighted the deficient current measures,[162] which were previously discussed in the second chapter.

Although the commissions reforms do not consider that members of the jury are completing a city obligation, requiring some having time off work thus forcing such genuine disciplines may appear to be excessively serious. Maybe a hearer does not completely comprehend the tenets they should comply, making it questionable if a criminal offense is the appropriate technique for discipline. The Commission’s report highlights that some consultees were stressed the offense would not have the expected preventive impact, because of comparative enactment authorized in Australia.[163] The Commission put this down to the absence of arraignments in Australia,[164] however did not consider why they are low. A report arranged for the Victorian Department of Justice proposed that the courts are hesitant to indict when legal hearers are just attempting to give a valiant effort,[165] so to receive a sentence is unwarranted.

Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and Juries Act 1974

The Criminal Justice and Courts Act was sanctioned to elucidate what conduct is restricted.[166]

S.20C[167] makes it an offense for attendants to take part in other prohibited conduct amid the trial, with the administration’s aim of the offense being to enlighten that behaviour will not be tolerated.[168] Prohibited conduct is characterised as, “conduct from which it may reasonably be concluded that the person intends to try the issue otherwise than because of the evidence presented in the proceedings on the issue”,[169] however this leaves space for tact. It doesn’t particularly address what “conduct” is and is not allowed it could even allude to a jury members use of their own opinion.[170] The wide extent of this segment does the inverse to what the act suggests, includes even more misjudging about what precisely disallowed act is, rather than elucidation.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act[171], no longer has impact in England and Wales yet was supplanted with exemptions to guarantee appropriate examination concerning legal hearer unfortunate behaviour still happens despite the presentation of the new offense.[172] Section 20D[173] it maintains the privacy of juror’s thoughts, highlighting the significance of jury mystery, as distinguished in section one. This jury secrecy is argumentative as this mystery is the main issue that stands between the comprehension of an understanding of jury considerations. Having the capacity to recognize the reason a juror and juries choose is essential in distinguishing whether a jury and member of the jury has comprehended the instructions and evidence given and whether the litigant has infringed upon the law. It is difficult to decide these variables with jury secrecy. Be that as it may, it is too much of a contentious issue to simply withdraw the privilege of jury secrecy. As previously expressed they play out a civic obligation and take time from their life to participate in jury service, to deny them this privilege is to just debilitate the general population’s certainty and create an absence of willing participants.

Judicial Direction

Clearer direction could be given to legal hearers, covering how they are required to act and what precisely improper conduct is. An ordinary lay participant may not comprehend the outcome of being in contempt or what it implies.[174] The utilization of ‘legal language’ will be confusing for some, bringing about comprehension challenges for the jury with any expert evidence or terms.[175] Because of the current advancements inside the Practice Direction, a judge can help with legal concepts,[176] suggesting the courts are acknowledging the difficulties some have with unfamiliar language by taking further precautions.

Then again, it could have little consequence as it is excessively troublesome, making it impossible to ignore any biased or even obscure inclinations they already possess,[177] regardless of the possibility that the directions are rehashed all through the trial, despite everything they might be overlooked.[178] Lord Judge identified that on the off chance that juries are to be politically significant, then judges must find an approach to bring the jury under lawful control,[179] in this manner it appears direction, simultaneously with other approaches could diminish wrongdoing, improving the publics certainty that members of the jury play out their part without interference of external factors.[180] It certainly seems arguable that Lord Judge has not understood the issue and thinks that these reforms are significant enough to create a difference. From these proposals and reforms, there is a real struggle to identify and great difference to the system we have now. Also, there is no way of measuring an improvement in fairness, so there is no way these ideas be enacted and given a fair reception as to their merit or criticism as to their detriment. The Lord Judge seems to feel that this new direction and understanding along with the fear of criminal convictions will spark a new wave of jury that will be streamlined with fairness and understanding. It is not that clear and simple if a jury member has pre-requisite ideals about men, women, blacks, whites and any other gender or racial stereotypes. To think that these biases will just cease due to understanding of the law or role of a juror is naïve.

Project Implicit[181] researchers challenged scientists to create an intervention that would change people’s implicit biases. They pitted 17 of these interventions against each other in a huge study using the computerized Implicit Associations Test (IAT): a widely-recognized measure of implicit biases. Over 17,000 white participants took part in the study. Contemplating the injustice of racial discrimination (using the example of the US basketball team and its black stars), didn’t affect bias scores. While these rational, philosophical approaches can render a none racial bias approach ‘yes, of course I agree that everyone deserves equal career opportunities’ they don’t seem to alter our unconscious beliefs.[182] This study demonstrates the real fact that inherent biases cannot be just undone and if people don’t realise that they are being racist or sexist it then becomes impossible to combat. This will be discussed to greater detail later.

Jury Deliberations

Keeping jury thoughts private is key for the framework, yet it does not permit the pubic to see how they have deciphered the confirmation to achieve the decision.[183] A possible solution could be for the jury to give a contemplated decision, which would permit people an insight to find how they make their choice without interrupting in their protection in the court. In any case, there would be many challenges faced with this as they may have achieved a decision, yet not every jury member could reach the same conclusion, in the same way. Taxquet v Belgium,[184] the ECtHR adjudged that members of the jury do not have to give purposes behind their choice, if the respondent comprehends the decision, proposing this has been considered yet is not constructive

, as it would change the way of their part.[185] This is reciprocated in the case of Saric v Denmark,[186] the court held contemplated decisions are not in keeping with Article 6 in this manner members of the jury don’t need to legitimize their considerations as it won’t influence their general unprejudiced nature.

To attempt and assess what occurs amid jury thoughts, similar to other countries, a jury monitor could overlook and observe the members.[187] A jury screen could watch the individuals.[188] It could help keeping them concentrated on their task and additionally watching out for any wrongdoing. This would guarantee that attendants don’t talk about privy information with others, yet it could influence their thoughts on the off chance that they were being viewed, as they may not be as honest as they would be in private. Openness is ascertained to enhance the nature of the basic leadership handle,[189] so in the event that they were being watched, they might not have any desire to talk out loud, rather remain quiet about their perspectives, making consultations less honest and maybe more arranged. Seckerson v UK,[190] resounded this and said as it is a civic role, they ought to be allowed to air their feelings without the dread of repercussions. The right of Jury secrecy permits members of the jury to voice their conclusion without it being recorded, yet this right obstructs our capacity to audit their way to a conclusion,[191] making it a difficult balancing act  into the level of satisfactory examination and protecting jury secrecy. The Commission recommended an exemption to permit endorsed scholarly research into jury considerations.[192] This demonstrates the benefit of keeping consultations private has been recognized and by exploring into them would lessen the certainty and trust we have in the framework.

The Law commission contemplated acquainting a drop box framework with make secrecy for members of the jury who need to report anything.[193] Another option could be to have a number that can be used to ring or text with a declaration of impropriety, anonymously. At present, there is a trouble with members of the jury revealing issues to the judge, as they might not have any desire to speak to the judge regarding another’s misconduct. It is reported that 14% of jurors said they would not do anything if another jury member acted inappropriately since they would feel uncomfortable.[194] As members of the jury will work with each other for quite a long time, some might be hesitant to report, needing to keep up a relationship.[195] If a juror was being racist, for example, and was intimidating it would be easier to sit quiet and not make an issue of it, so if the option of a number to ring or text with the issue to confess about the racist juror, they may have more confidence to come forward. As well it may make other jurors think more about their actions if they know that they can be easily and anonymously reported.

Creating a Veil of Ignorance

Through issues previously raised. An argument can be made to completely overhaul the entire jury process, by taking inspiration from John Rawls theory of justice.[196] He uses a device called the original position to ask us which principles of justice we would choose to regulate the basic institutions of our society if we were behind a ‘veil of ignorance.’ Imagine we do not know who we are – our race, sex, wealth status, class, or any distinguishing feature – so that we would not be biased in our own favour.[197]

By taking the elements of this theory and applying it to a jury system it could create an unbiased impartial jury system. If we allowed jury members to only hear the facts about the case and never see the defendant or hear them speak along with knowing no other physical characteristics about them. The only decision can be based on the sheer facts alone. The jury cannot be allowed to know the defendants; name; age; gender; ethnicity; background explicitly nothing about the defendant at all. The only information given to the jury would be that of the facts of the case the crime committed and the evidence against the defendant and the defence for said defendant.

An issue that could be raised by this theory is that not being able to see the defendant takes away an essential part of a jury trial. But does this mean it’s a negative. This surely means that it only creates a more impartial and unbiased verdict as it may be argued you can’t see the defendant and the sight could lead your decision one way or another dependant on the look of the individual. If you have a large man covered in tattoos and a small angelic looking girl both facing a murder charge, rightly or wrongly and arguably most people would convict the man before the woman on sheer looks alone.[198] Neither defendant is more likely than the other to have committed the crime other than our own stereotypical biases. The argument here is to take all the pre-requisite stereotypes and biases out of the equation and focus solely on the facts and evidence alone.

The final argument is that it would be a complex system to input and the larger the criminal cases the harder it would be to hide the identity of the defendant. The use of internet and other modern day media would influence a jury’s decision and it would difficult to hide the identity of the person. The idea seems unique and ideal in many ways but is very preliminary and is in much need of further analysis and thought. But it does seem to offer a solution which no other reform proposition has ever done, creating total anonymity thus taking out all preconceived racial and sexist biases both conscious and subconscious.

Abolishment of the Jury

While the recommendations of arrangements above could conceivably help lessen legal hearer prejudice, to totally resolve the issue seems unimaginable in this manner the subject of whether the current jury framework is still working in our society is noticeably clear. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 presented judge-only trials where there is clear jury or juror bias,[199] however only in remarkable conditions. Judges comprehend the significance of achieving a decision utilizing exclusively the evidence introduced in the court.[200] Roughly only 5% of cases are heard by a jury, [201] so if they somehow managed to be abolished, it maybe would not have a dramatic effect. Members of the jury frequently have minimal lawful understanding or education, so why would it be a good idea for them to settle on such extraordinary decisions. Given the recognized issues with ensuring reasonableness in jury trials, it appears to be legitimate to consider whether the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales would better protect the public’s entitlement to a fair trial by abolishing juries and having judge only trials. Judges know the significance of judging the respondent just on the evidence and information exhibited in court, so the standard of justice would be better secured with a judge just trial.

In relation to objective impartiality, it has been established that the public view trial by jury as a fairer institution than trial by judge alone .[202] Judges can hold one-sided sees and legal hearers, however the way that there are twelve people that make up a jury representing general society that there is an assortment of perspectives and experience that illuminate the last decision, [203]  so regardless of the possibility that one member of the jury were to hold an extreme view point it would be adjusted by different perspectives. This implies if trial by jury was to be abolished then the public’s perception may decrease in confidence, with regards to the unprejudiced nature of trials, which is pivotal to satisfy Article 6.[204]

Jury representativeness and precision can be portrayed as an extra advantage of the ‘broader range of experience and expertise’[205] that a jury conveys contrasted with a solitary judge; they have more wisdom to elicit from to figure out the genuine actualities of the case and are unmistakably more inclined to represent society more adequately than one judge who is probably going to be a white, middle aged male.[206] While there is as yet generous open trust in the jury framework it would appear to be silly to surrender it, considering – as noted in Chapter One – the solidness that this certainty brings. Likewise does the abolishment of juries truly mollify dread of prejudice nature through sexual orientation or race. A judge is not any more obliged to be honest of their reasoning in view of physical attributes than any jury participant. In any case, the preferred standpoint with this procedure would be one of straightforwardness as it could be asked for that judges offer reason to their deliberation and decision. In this way, at last conceding us the basis and understanding with regards to the thinking behind a criminal conviction.

The ideal of a judge being legitimately and morally prepared, compared to a conventional lay individual from society might be similarly as commendable, if not better. Juries are perceived to be fair-minded, as most judges originate from comparable foundations, whereas members of the jury are people who will generally have more compassion and understanding. They will probably have the capacity to identify with circumstances in a trial, particularly as there are twelve, each bringing their own particular encounters into the court.[207] This gives the general population some insurance, as judges are associated with the courts, hearers are normal individuals, along these lines they go about as a support between the state and society, guaranteeing a reasonable and fair trial.

By and large the typical criticalness of a jury, which invokes the fairness and responsibility excepted within our society, might be excessively meaningful, making it impossible to surrender, [208] particularly as it creates a system that is decided by piers within society.[209] As Humphreys J asserted: ‘I cannot bring myself to believe that there are any persons, who would vote in favour of the abolition of trial by jury in serious cases’.[210] Despite the fact that this was said in 1956, juries still give people in general certainty, recommending they are a regarded as some portion of our lawful framework. Abolishment would be an outrageous answer for the issue, in any case it should be altered to align the framework a modern society.

A possible option could be to utilise the amount of Law students we have across the UK, in 2015 some 68,150 students were studying university law degrees.[211] These students have some basic understanding of the law, which intern gives them great experience of a courtroom and getting to witness judges and barristers first hand. Students are spread across the UK thus allowing them to be accessible everywhere. There are some issues with this thesis however; in 2015, some 180,000 people[212] sat on a jury. With only having nearly a third of that in students the idea becomes more complex. Even if we suggested them sitting numerous times this would then arguably cause interference with their studies and when exam era ensues this would be problematic. Also 12 students studying Law at university probably does not comply with the idea of trial by jury of piers. So, this idea does not work directly however there is scope for ideas for jury reform with using people in the legal profession, be it working professionals and or university and academic scholars.

Conclusion

This paper started by looking at the historical backdrop of endeavours to control member of the jury conduct through the procedural system and the Contempt of Court Act 1981, to save Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, even regardless of the presentation of criminal offenses and the slight modifications in the courts, right now the law around there is still considered lacking. Despite what might be expected, member of the jury unfortunate behaviour was recognized by Parliament after the Law Commission’s proposals for change, now monitoring the issue could bring about nearer observation with the capability of further change. Seemingly, their choice to criminalize certain demonstrations of juror misconduct is yet not a sufficient impediment, with the likelihood to dishearten legal hearers from revealing any wrongdoing, because of the seriousness of the discipline a fellow juror could receive. Many as of now see jury obligation as a weight, along these lines the expansion of detainment will just reinforce this view.[213] The issues considered is yet present despite the advancements in the law, so thus it is basic that extra arrangements are considered as other options to use as a deterrent.

A strategy for potential determination is instruction, giving people more prominent information about what showing up as a member of the jury means. If they know about the duty it brings, it will in this way urge members of the jury to submit to the tenets.[214] If people are not at first taught and coordinated, the foundation of the issue will never be unravelled and the probability of indictments will just increment because of their absence of the information about how to conduct effectively. The usage of instruction might be a test, requiring real changes to the tutoring framework, the requirement for instructors who spend significant time in the jury framework and the costs it might bring about. Over the long haul, the advantages exceed the negatives, making it a beneficial modification.

In the last investigation, steps are accessible to help the jury in how to carry on effectively, guaranteeing fair trials are adhered to and the eventual fate of juries stay fair-minded and unprejudiced.[215] Taking all things into account, the jury is a basic part of the criminal equity framework and without them would bring about disastrous modifications in the operation of the courts, alongside the weakening of the publics bolster. To abrogate the jury is basically impossible, which is clear from Lord Devlin statement: ‘Trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives’.[216] Trial by jury has noteworthy levels of open certainty, despite the issues that race and sexual orientation display, it is a foundation deserving of assurance. The legislature has plainly perceived the requirement for change to guarantee decency is accomplished. Different explanations behind attendant unfortunate behaviour were set out in Chapter Two through both racial and sexual orientation predisposition. The underlying idea of the ‘veil of ignorance jury’ are fascinating and extremely practical in application, there are many components of which would require work however the idea is scintillating and makes an exciting debate for future reform contentions.

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Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 3.13.

Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) paras 4.31 – 4. 57

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Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 2.12 paras 5.16 – 5.35.

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---

[1] D. C. Ormerod, ‘Trial – duties of judge – discharge of jury’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 776,777

[2] N.Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[3] Juries Act 1974 (c.23)

[4] Judge Denyer, ‘Managing the jury: Part 1’ [2015] Archbold Review 7

[5] J. Carruthers, ‘Are juries safe?’ [2001] Scots Law Times 218–219

[6] ibid

[7] ibid

[8] M. A. Kotler, ‘Reappraising the jury’s role as finder of fact’ (1985) 20 Georgia Law Review 127

[9] European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 6

[10] Piersack v Belgium A. 53 (1982); (1983) 5 E.H.R.R 169

[11] Ibid, at 9.

[12] G. Daly and R. Pattenden, ‘RACIAL BIAS AND THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY’ (2005) 64(03) The Cambridge Law Journal 678–710

[13] Remli v. France (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 253.

[14] R v Gough [1993] 2 WLR 883 (HL)

[15] R. v. Hussain [2005] All E.R. (D) 82 (Oct.)

[16] ibid at 9

[17] Contempt of Court Act 1981

[18] Holm v Sweden (1994) Series A no 279 18 EHRR 79 [31]

[19] Puller v UK, (1996) 22 EHRR 391

[20] A. Jennings, ‘The silence of the jury room’ [2002] Archbold News 6–8

[21] R v M, [2004]EWCA Crim 1610

[22] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

[23] Anglo-Saxon law, J. D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 494-503 (2002)

[24] Ibid

[25] Taxquet v Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR 26

[26] S. 20D Juries Act 1974

[27] Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; Boston v W. S. Bagshaw & Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1135.

[28] Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 8

[29] Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015

[30] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 2 WLR 201 at [25], [57] and [139].

[31] D. C. Ormerod and R. Percival, ‘Jury: disclosure of content of discussion after trial by juror’ [2002] Criminal Law Review 923–924

[32] Nicola Haralambous, ‘Investigating Impropriety in Jury Deliberations: A Recipe for Disaster?’ (2004) 68 J Crim L 411, 415-416

[33] Ibid

[34] Regina v Connor HL 22 Jan 2004

[35] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, 1 AC 1118

[36] Ibid, para 47.

[37] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[38] K. Quinn, ‘Jury bias and the European Convention on Human Rights: a well-kept secret?’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 1010–1011

[39] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, 1 AC 1118

[40] Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 2008, vol. 31, p. 295–360.

[41] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, 1 AC 1118

[42] N. Haralambous, ‘Investigating Impropriety in Jury Deliberations: A Recipe for Disaster?’ (2004) 68 J Crim L 411. 417

[43] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118

[44] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118 [6]

[45] A. A. S. Zuckerman, ‘Law, Fact or Justice?’ (1986) 66 BULR 487 at 496.

[46] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

[47] Mylock v. Saladine (1764) 1 W. Bl. 480, per Lord Mansfield C.J.

[48] R. v. Bryan [2001] EWCA Crim 2550, at [48] per Waller L.J.

[49] Gillian Daly and Rosemary Pattenden, ‘RACIAL BIAS AND THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY’ (2005) 64(03) The Cambridge Law Journal 678–681

[50] Contempt of Court Act 1981

[51] I. Cram, Borrie and Lowe: Law of Contempt, (2010, 4^th edn London: LexisNexis Butterworths) 27

[52] Attorney-General Respondent v Times Newspapers Ltd. and Another Appellants, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 994; [1992] 1 A.C. 191

[53] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[54] J. Roberts and M. Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/09 (2009). See also the surveys discussed in C. Thomas, ‘Exposing the Myths of Jury Service’ [2008] Crim LR 415 at 416-7.

[55] R. J. MacCoun and T. R. Tyler, ‘The Basis of Citizens Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy and Efficiency’ (1988) 12 Law and Human Behaviour 335

[56] N. S. Marder, ‘An Introduction to Comparative Jury Systems’ (2011) 86 Chi-Kent L Rev 453.

[57] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 45

[58] Julian V Roberts and Mike Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/09, 2009)

[59] Attorney-General v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570, [2011] 2 Cr App Rep 271 [30]

[60] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 63

[61]  Bentham, Jeremy (1977). Burns, J.H; Hart, H.L.A., eds. A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government. London: The Athlone Press. p. 393. 

[62] W. J. Parker, ‘Free expression and the function of the jury’ 65 (1985) Boston University Law Review 483, 494

[63] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[64] See M. Zander, “The Complaining Juror” (2000) 150 N.L.J. 723.

[65] J. Jackson, “Making Juries Accountable” (2002) 50 Am.J.Comp.L. 477 at p.525.

[66] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, 1 AC 1118

[67] Katie Quinn, ‘Jury bias and the European Convention on Human Rights: a well-kept secret?’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 1014

[68] J. Roberts and M. Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review, Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/09 (2009). See also the surveys discussed in C. Thomas, ‘Exposing the Myths of Jury Service’ [2008] Crim LR 415 at 416-7.

[69] C. Thomas, ‘Are juries fair?’ [2010] 1(10) Ministry of Justice

[70] Ed, ‘Are juries fair?’ [2010] 4(13) Are juries fair? 253-254

[71] C. Thomas, Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System, MOJ Research Series 02/07 (2007), Appendix 6.

[72] C. Thomas, Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System, MOJ Research Series 02/07 (2007),iv.

[73] Ed, ‘Are juries fair?’ [2010] 4(13) Are juries fair? 253-254

[74] N. Haralambous, (2007). Juries and extraneous material: a question of integrity. Journal of Criminal Law, 71(6), pp.520-525.

[75] R v Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584

[76] Attorney-General v Scotcher [2005] UKHL 36

[77] R v Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584

[78] “Table KS201SC – Ethnic group: All people”. 2011 Census: Ethnic group, local authorities in the United Kingdom. 2013. Retrieved 9 March 2017.

[79] R. v. Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 A.C. 1118, at [142], [151].

[80] ICERD, Article 1. This definition of “race”, which is used throughout the article, draws immigrants, asylum seekers, minority religions and foreigners within the concept of racial discrimination.

[81] Jury Research and Impropriety, CP 04/05 21 Jan. 2005 (henceforth “CP 04/05”).

[82] J. Pfeiffer, “Reviewing the Evidence on Jury Racism” (1990) 69 Nebraska L. Rev. 230; S. Sommers and P. Ellsworth, “How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries?” (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 997.

[83] Ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts: Perceptions of Fairness and Equality of Treatment Research Series No. 2/03 (March 2003). 455-456

[84] Ibid p. ii.

[85] Ibid. P.39-40.

[86] Ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts: Perceptions of Fairness and Equality of Treatment Research Series No. 2/03 (March 2003).P.81.

[87] K. Roach, “Challenges for Cause and Racial Discrimination” (1995) 37 Crim. L.Q. 410, 417; W. George and L. Martinez, “Victim Blaming in Rape: Effects of Victim and Perpetrator Race, Type of Rape, and Participant Racism” (2002) 26 Psychology of Women Quarterly 110.

[88] R. v. Bowyer. The Independent, 21 Dec. 2001, p. 1.

[89] Mylock v. Saladine (1764) 1 W. Bl. 480, per Lord Mansfield C.J.

[90] R. v. Bryan [2001] EWCA Crim 2550, at [48] per Waller L.J.

[91] J. Gobert, “In Search of the Impartial Jury” (1988) 79 J. Crim. L. and Crim. 269, 271, 325.

[92] Race Diversity and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy” (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1032, 1034.

[93] R. v. Smith (Lance) [2003] EWCA Crim 283, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2229, at [37]; R. v. M [2004] EWCA Crim 1610, at [15]-[16].

[94] The dividing line between “acceptable ordinary differences in expectations and reactions based on experience, and unacceptable prejudice or bias” is of course problematic: Ellis and Diamond, “Race Diversity and Jury Composition”, 1035.

[95] A. Kalunta-Crumpton, Race and Drug Trials (Aldershot 1999), pp. 184, 200.

[96] A judge told an Old Bailey jury trying a murder trial: “It is quite difficult in this case with the Ethiopian witnesses because you may think they all looked rather similar. It was difficult to find any distinguishing features”: The Times, 29 Feb. 2000, p. 14. This had two ethnic minority jurors shaking their heads and a juror later complained about the comment to a court official: The Guardian, 29 Feb. 2000, p. 1.

[97] A. Kalunta-Crumpton, Race and Drug Trials. There is a widely-held belief that young urban black men are muggers and drug dealers. (Aldershot 1999), pp. 184, 200.

[98] Cp. Vidmar “When All of US are Victims”, 1153. The London bomb attacks in July 2005 are bound to have boosted this type of stereotyping.

[99] C. Phillips and B Bowling, “Racism, Ethnicity, Crime and Criminal Justice”, in M.Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (3rd edn., Oxford 2002), p. 588. Cp. R. v. Elias (CA, unreported, 15 Dec. 1998).

[100] Ibid. at 10.

[101] [2004] UKHL 2, at [67].

[102] R. v. Brestovic [2001] EWCA Crim 570, at [13].

[103] Hood, Shute and Seemungal, Ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts, 91.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Daly, G. and Pattenden, R. (2005). RACIAL BIAS AND THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY. The Cambridge Law Journal, 64(03), pp.678-710.

[106] Submission of the Young Barristers’ Committee to the Government’s Consultation on the Auld Report, para. 12, available at www.dca.gov.uk/criminal/auldcom/lorg/lorg1.htm.

[107] R. v. Thoron [2001] EWCA Crim 1797, at [17]. Cp. R. v. Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, at [7], [144].

[108] The Bar Council and Law Society, Views on Trial by Jury: The British Public Takes the Stand (Jan. 2002), available at www.dca.gov.uk/criminal/auldcom/lorg/14.htm.

[109] C. Bootman, “Race and Racism–the Missing Dimensions in the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice”, in Criminal Justice in Crisis (Aldershot 1994), p. 95; L. Bridges et al, Ethnic Minority Defendants and the Right to Elect Jury Trial (CRE, 2000), p. 18.

[110] Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Court Administration, ‘A Thematic Review of Quality of Service Provided by HMCS for Jurors in the Criminal Courts’ (December 2006) 20:

[111] M. Zander and P. Henderson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Crown Court Survey (Research Study No 19, HMSO, 1993). See also Penny Darbyshire, ‘What Can We Learn from Published Jury Research? Findings for the Criminal Courts Review 2001’ (2001) Criminal Law Review 970.

[112] C. Thomas, ‘Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 02/07, June 2007) p.8-10

[113] C. Thomas, ‘Are Juries Fair?’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 01/10, January 2010): 

[114] J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Jury Trials(1979).

[115] J. Airs and A. Shaw “Jury Excusal and Deferral” Home Office RDSD Report No.102 (1999)

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid. at 112. P.8.

[118] J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Jury Trials (1979)

[119] Survey commissioned by the Bar Council, the Law Society and the Criminal Bar Association and published in January 2002. The Crown Court Study in the early 1990s also found that 80% of jurors who had served on a jury rated the jury system as either very good or good. M. Zander and P. Henders

[120] C. Thomas, ‘Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 02/07, June 2007) p.8

[121] P. Darbyshire, A. Maughan and A. Stewart, “What Can the English Legal System Learn from Jury Research Published up to 2001” Appendix to Review of the Criminal Courts (2001)

[122] A Thematic Review of Quality of Service Provided by HMCS for Jurors in the Criminal Courts, HMICA (December 2006) section 4.36.

[123] Ibid.

[124] C. Thomas, ‘Exposing the Myths of Jury Service’ [2008] Crim LR 415 at 416-7.

[125] Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 2008, vol. 31, p. 295–360.

[126] Section Part II Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28-32, 82

[127] Ibid.

[128] S. Sommers and P. Ellsworth, “How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research” (2003) 78(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 997.

[129] C. Petersen “Institutionalized Racism: The Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection Process” McGill Law Journal 38 (April 1993).

[130] C. Thomas, ‘Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 02/07, June 2007) p.10.

[131] NCSC.org. (2017). NCSC. National Centre for State Courts. [online] Available at: http://ww.ncsc.org [Accessed 10 Mar. 2017].

[132] H. Fukurai “Race, Social Class, and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and Jury Selection” Journal of Criminal Justice Vol.24, No.1, pp.71-88 (1996)

[133] J. Stone and R. Dennis Race and Ethnicity: Comparative and Theoretical Approaches (2003)

[134] Challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court over a 30-year period from Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) to Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)

[135] While challenges for cause and the prosecution’s right to “stand by” a juror remain, both are rarely used and are governed under restrictive provisions of the Juries Act 1974 and guidelines issued by the Attorney-General in November 1988, respectively.

[136] Judicial Statistics 2004 Table 6.11 p.91. Section 17 of the Juries Act 1974

[137] Darbyshire, P. (2001). What can we learn from published jury research? Findings for the Criminal Courts Review 2001. Criminal Law Review, pp.970-979.

[138] C. Kleinke, and C. Mayer, (1990). Evaluation of Rape victim by Men and Women with High and Low Belief in a Just World. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 14(3), pp.343-353.

[139] Ibid.

[140] M. Zander and P. Henderson, Crown Court Study (1993),

[141] Ibid, p.235.

[142] Cheryl Thomas, ‘Diversity and Fairness in the Jury System’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 02/07, June 2007) p.8-10

[143] A. Mossière and J. Dalby (2008). The Influence of Gender and Age in Mock Juror Decision-Making. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 4(4): A comparison of sample types International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 42-43, p. 58(ff.)

[144] R. Boatright, (2001). Generational and age-based differences in attitudes towards jury service. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 19, 285-304

[145] ibid.

[146] R. ForsterLee, L. ForsterLee, I. Horowitz, & E. King. (2006). The effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror gender on evidence processing in a murder trial. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 24, 179–198.

[147] Ibid. at 71.

[148] L.S. Guy & J.F. Edens. (2003). Juror decision-making in a mock sexually violent predator trial: Gender differences in the impact of divergent types of expert testimony. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 21, 215-237.

[149] L.S. Guy, & J.F. Edens, (2006). Gender differences in attitudes toward psychopathic sexual offenders. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 24, 65-85.

[150]  Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 1.3

[151] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

[152] Law Commission, Contempt of Court: a consultation paper (2012) para 1.4

[153] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 3.13

[154] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 1.4

[155] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 2.122

[156] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 2.122 paras 5.16 – 5.35

[157] ibid para 1.22

[158] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 2.12

[159] Ibid, para 1.14

[160] R v Mirza [2004] UKHL

[161] Law Commission, Contempt of Court: a consultations paper (2012) No 209

[162] Ibid para 4.77 


[163] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 3.61

[164] Ibid para 3.62

[165] J. Johnston, Patrick Keyzer and others, Juries and Social Media: A report prepared for the Victorian Department of Justice (Standing Council on Law and Justice 2013) para 4.15 accessed 14March

[166] A.T.H Smith, ‘Repositioning the law of contempt: The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015’ 11 (2015) Criminal Law Review 845

[167] S.20 C Juries Act 1974

[168] Hansard, House of Commons Public Bill Committee: Criminal Justice and Courts Bill, col.406 (March 25, 2014)

[169] S.20C (2) Juries Act 1974

[170] A.T.H Smith, ‘Repositioning the law of contempt: The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015’ 11 (2015), Criminal Law Review 845

[171] Contempt of Court Act 1981

[172] A.T.H, ‘Repositioning the law of contempt: The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015’, 11 (2015) Criminal Law Review 845

[173] S. 20D Juries Act 1974

[174] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law, 317.

[175] J. Horan and S. Maine, ‘Criminal Jury Trials in 2030: A Law Odyssey’ (2014) 41 Journal of Law and Society 553

[176] Criminal Practice direction, (CA (Crim Div: Criminal Practice Directions: Amendment No. 1) [2015]; [2016] EWCA Crime 97, para 26k 10 accessed 20 April 2016

[177] E. Brickman and others, ‘How juror internet use has changed the American jury trial. Journal of Court Innovation’  (2008) 1 Journal Court of Innovation 287, 291

[178] M. Zora, ‘The Real Social Network: How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and Smart Phones Affect the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights’ 2012 (2012) University of Illinois Law Review, 577 594

[179] K. Crosby, ‘Controlling Devlin’s jury: what the jury thinks, and what the jury sees online’ (2012) 1 Criminal Law Review

[180] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[181]  Project Implicit. (2014). implicit biases. [online] Available at: https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html [Accessed 3 Apr. 2017].

[182] S. Bailey,(2014). Can You Overcome Inbuilt Bias?. [online] Forbes.com. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastianbailey/2014/08/14/can-you-overcome-inbuilt-bias/#e02950240ee7 [Accessed 3 Apr. 2017].

[183] S. Bailey,(2014). Can You Overcome Inbuilt Bias?. [online] Forbes.com. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastianbailey/2014/08/14/can-you-overcome-inbuilt-bias/#e02950240ee7 [Accessed 3 Apr. 2017].

[184] Taxquet v Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR 26

[185] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[186] Sari v Denmark (1999)App. No. 31013/96

[187] C. Murdoch, ‘The Oath and the Internet’(2012) 176 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 149

[188] ibid

[189] P. Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials, (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 213, 215

[190] Seckerson v UK (2012) 54 EHRR [44-45]

[191] N. Taylor and D. Roderick, ‘Judicial Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 Journal of Criminal Law 43

[192] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) paras 4.31 – 4. 57

[193] Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): Juror Misconduct and Internet Publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) para 4.91

[194] C. Thomas, ‘Avoiding the Perfect Storm of Juror Contempt’ [2013] CLR 483, 488

[195] Seckerson v UK (2012) 54 EHRR [44-45]

[196] A. Potanah, (2016). Rawls’ “justice as fairness”: should we run a state by it? Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics, 5, pp.120-128.

[197] M. Nussbaum; Frontiers of Justice; Harvard U Press; Cambridge, MA; 2006; Kindle location 1789

[198] N. Goulette, J. Wooldredge, J. Frank, and L. Travis, (2015). From Initial Appearance to Sentencing: Do Female Defendants Experience Disparate Treatment? Journal of Criminal Justice, 43(5), pp.406-417.

[199] Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 44

[200] N. Haralambous, ‘Educating jurors: technology, the Internet and the jury system’, (2010) 19 Information & Communications Technology Law 261

[201] A. Ashworth, and M. Redmayne, The criminal process (2005, 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press) 297

[202] J.V. Roberts and M. Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/09, 2009); Nick Taylor and Robert Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

[203] P. Thornton, ‘Trial by jury: 50 years of change’ (2004) CLR 119, 135

[204] R. MacCoun and T. Tyler, ‘The basis of citizens’ perception of the criminal jury: procedural fairness, accuracy, efficieny’ (1998) 12(3) Law and Hum Beh 333, 338; Mike Redmayne, ‘Theorising Jury Reform’ in Antony Duff and others (eds), The Trial on Trial: Volume Two: Judgment and Calling to Account (Hart Publishing 2006) ch 6

[205] N. Taylor and R. Denyer, ‘Judical Management of Juror Impropriety’ (2014) 78 JCL 43

[206] Courts Judicial Diversity statistics – Gender, Ethnicity, Profession and Age’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, April 2014) < https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/judicial-diversity-statistics-2014/> accessed 1 March 2015

[207] P. Thornton, ‘Trial by jury: 50 years of change’ [2004] CLR 119

[208] N. Haralambous, ‘Educating jurors: technology, the Internet and the jury system’, (2010) 19 Information & Communications Technology Law 261, 262

[209] A.D. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (2000, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing)

[210] Justice Humphreys, ‘Do We Need a Jury’ [1956] Crim LR 457, quoted in Peter Thornton, ‘Trial by Jury: 50 Years of Change’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 119

[211] UCAS. (2016). Law. [online] Available at: https://www.ucas.com/ucas/subject-guide-list/law [Accessed 3 Apr. 2017].

[212] P. Collinson, (2016). Jury service: what are your chances of being called up again and again? [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/aug/20/jury-service-repeated-summons [Accessed 3 Apr. 2017].

[213] V.H Star, M. McCormick, Jury Selection, (2001, 3^rd edn, Aspen Publishers) 288

[214] T. Hoffmeister, ‘Preventing Juror Misconduct in a Digital World’ (2015) 90 Chicago-Kent Law Review 981, 994

[215] M. Zora, ‘The Real Social Network: How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and Smart Phones Affect the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights’ 2012 (2012) University of Illinois Law Review 577, 582

[216] P. Devlin, Trial by Jury, (1966, 3^rd edn, London: Stevens: Methuen) 164-165

Table of Cases

Attorney-General Respondent v Times Newspapers Ltd. and Another Appellants, [1991] 2 W.L.R.994; [1992] 1 A.C. 191.

Attorney-General v Scotcher [2005] UKHL 36.

Piersack v Belgium A. 53 (1982); (1983) 5 E.H.R.R 169.

Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; Boston v W. S. Bagshaw & Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1135.

Holm v Sweden (1994).

Mylock v. Saladine (1764) 1 W. Bl. 480, per Lord Mansfield C.J.

Norris v Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) 

Regina v Connor HL 22 Jan [2004].

Remli v. France (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 253.

R. v. Bowyer. [2001].

R. v. Brestovic [2001] EWCA Crim 570, at [13].

R. v. Bryan [2001] EWCA Crim 2550, at [48] per Waller L.J.

R v Gough [1993] 2 WLR 883 (HL).

R. v. Hussain [2005] All E.R. 

R. v. M [2004] EWCA Crim 1610, at [15]-[16].

R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118, para 47.

R v Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584.

R. v. Smith (Lance) [2003] EWCA Crim 283, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2229, at [37]; 

R. v. Thoron [2001] EWCA Crim 1797, at [17]. 

Sari v Denmark (1999) App. No. 31013/96.

Seckerson v UK (2012) 54 EHRR [44-45].

Taxquet v Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR 26.

Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).

Table of Legislation

Contempt of Court Act 1981

Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015

Criminal Justice Act 2003

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 6

Juries Act 1974 (c.23)