Legal Case Summary
Tulk v Moxhay [1848] 41 ER 1143
Established that there are occasions in which equitable covenants can bind future purchasers of property and ‘run with the land’.
Facts
The claimant, Tulk, owned several properties in Leicester Square, London, and sold one such property to another, making the purchaser promise to not build on the property so as to help keep Leicester Square ‘uncovered with buildings’ and creating an equitable covenant. The purchaser subsequently sold the land and it underwent multiple transactions, and was eventually purchased by the defendant, Moxhay. Whilst Moxhay was aware of the covenant attached to the land at the time of the transaction, he claimed it was unenforceable as he had not been a party to the original transaction in which the covenant had been made.
Issue
Whether an equitable covenant limiting the use of a property could ‘run with the land’ and bind a future owner of the property.
Decision/Outcome
The High Court, consisting of Lord Cottenham, found for Tulk, and passed an injunction to prevent Moxhay from building on the land. The covenant had been intended to run with the land at the time it was made, and all subsequent purchasers had been informed of its existence. Moreover, as a covenant amounts to a contract between a vendor and vendee, it is enforceable against a purchaser for value with either constructive or actual notice. As Moxhay had actual notice of the covenant, he was obligated to abide by it. Notably, the relevance of this decision decreased with the introduction of the 1925 Land Registration Act which made such covenants a registrable interest.
Updated 20 March 2026
This case summary remains broadly accurate as a description of the decision in Tulk v Moxhay [1848] 41 ER 1143 and its core legal principle: that a restrictive covenant may bind successors in title who take with notice of it.
However, several points merit clarification for accuracy. First, the article describes the court as ‘the High Court’, but the decision was in fact delivered by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cottenham) sitting in the Court of Chancery, which is the more precise description. Second, the article states that the Land Registration Act 1925 made such covenants a ‘registrable interest’, which requires qualification. Under the current legislative framework — now primarily the Land Registration Act 2002 and the Land Charges Act 1972 — the position differs depending on whether land is registered or unregistered. For unregistered land, restrictive covenants created after 1925 must be registered as a Class D(ii) land charge under the Land Charges Act 1972 to bind a purchaser; if not registered, they are void against a purchaser of a legal estate for money or money’s worth regardless of notice. For registered land under the Land Registration Act 2002, restrictive covenants may be protected by entry of a notice on the register. The old doctrine of notice as applied in Tulk v Moxhay itself has therefore been substantially modified by statute and no longer operates in its original form in most practical contexts. Students should ensure they consult the current statutory framework when applying these principles to problem questions.
The substantive requirements for a restrictive covenant to run with the land (as developed by later cases such as London County Council v Allen [1914] and Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980]) are not discussed in this summary, and readers should be aware that the principle in Tulk v Moxhay has been refined considerably by subsequent case law.
