R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129
Accessory before the fact with knowledge of crime
Facts
The defendant purchased oxygen-cutting equipment. Weeks later, the equipment was used in a bank break-in and was left behind by the thieves. The defendant was convicted as an accessory before the fact. The conviction was founded upon the argument that the defendant purchased the equipment on behalf of the thieves and knew that it was to be used for breaking in to premises. The defendant appealed.
Issues
The defendant argued that even though he had suspected that the equipment might be wanted for some illegal purpose, he denied knowing actually what it would be used for. He claimed that the trial judge had failed to properly direct the jury in terms of what needs to be established in order to be able to convict someone of being accessory before the fact.
Decision/Outcome
The Court took the view that the trial judge had not erred in his directions to the jury. The Court held that it was sufficient to prove that the defendant knew about the thieves’ general intention to commit a crime, similar in type to the one subsequently actually committed. If, equipped with such knowledge, the defendant still did something to help in the commission of the crime (e.g. bought equipment he knew might be used in committing the crime like in the present case), he can be found guilty of being an accessory before the fact. In other words, the defendant does not need to know the specific time and date and location of the principal offence in advance in order to be found guilty of being an accessory before the fact. The defendant’s conviction was thus upheld.
Updated 20 March 2026
This article accurately summarises the decision in R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129 and the legal principle it established. The case remains good law and continues to be cited in relation to the mental element required for accessory liability. Readers should note, however, that the law on secondary liability (including accessories before the fact) has developed considerably since 1960. The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (as amended) governs statutory liability, and the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 substantially reformed the law on joint enterprise and secondary liability, overruling the prior ‘parasitic accessory liability’ doctrine established in Chan Wing-Siu. While Bainbridge itself was not overruled by Jogee, the broader framework within which it operates has changed. Students should read this case alongside Jogee and subsequent authorities to obtain an accurate picture of current secondary liability law.
