Gray v Jones [1939] 1 All ER 798; (1939) 55 TLR 437
King’s Bench Division, February 1939 — slander alleging a past conviction and the need to prove special damage.
Facts
The claimant ran a florist’s business in premises let to her by the defendant. During a dispute about her leaving, the landlord described her as a convicted person and said that he would not have her there. The exchange was loud enough for others to hear. She sued for slander.
The jury found for the claimant and assessed damages at £25. Atkinson J had reserved legal objections about whether the words were actionable without proof of special damage, meaning a particular financial or material loss caused by the statement.
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Issues
The defendant argued that an accusation of a past conviction did not expose the claimant to a fresh prosecution. On his argument, that meant she could not rely on the exception allowing claims for slander imputing certain criminal offences without proving special damage.
There was also a question about the meaning of the words. They had to impute an offence punishable by imprisonment; merely suggesting an offence punishable only by a fine would not satisfy the exception considered in the case.
Decision and reasoning
Atkinson J rejected the defendant’s arguments and entered judgment for the claimant for £25. He held that the basis of the exception was the harm which an accusation of serious criminal conduct could do to a person’s reputation. Such words could cause others to shun the person or exclude them from society. The rule did not depend on placing the claimant in danger of prosecution.
The judge relied on earlier authorities, particularly Fowler v Dowdney, where calling someone a returned convict had been held actionable. An allegation could continue to damage a person’s standing even if it suggested that punishment had already been served. Atkinson J did not read the discussion of possible prosecution in Heming v Power as overruling that principle.
The words also had to be considered in their setting. The defendant had been the claimant’s landlord for several years and used the alleged conviction as a reason for wanting her to leave. This was capable of conveying something more serious than a minor offence punishable only by a fine. The jury were entitled to understand the words as alleging an offence for which she could have been imprisoned.
A pleading objection did not change the result. The claimant’s solicitors had notified the defence before trial that this was the meaning she would allege. No timely objection had been made. The judge said that, had an amendment been necessary and requested at the appropriate stage, he would have allowed it.
Damages and costs
The defendant had already paid £25 into court while denying liability, exactly the amount the jury awarded. The judge distinguished the issue of liability from the issue of how much compensation was due.
The claimant received her general costs up to the payment into court and her later costs on liability. The judge could identify no additional costs incurred solely in disputing the amount of damages and made no costs award to the defendant. He also ordered payment of the money in court to the claimant.
The case therefore established that an allegation of a past conviction could be actionable without proof of special damage when it conveyed the necessary accusation of an imprisonable offence. Exposure to a new prosecution was not an additional requirement.
